BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Harvard Law School//NONSGML Events//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN X-WR-CALNAME:Harvard Law School - Events X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://hls.harvard.edu/calendar/ X-WR-CALDESC:Harvard Law School - Events BEGIN:VEVENT UID:20260223T0842Z-1771836125.3963-EO-741521-1@10.73.7.237 STATUS:CONFIRMED DTSTAMP:20260411T080542Z CREATED:20260222T224503Z LAST-MODIFIED:20260309T191735Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260311T121500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260311T131500 SUMMARY: When Courts Do—and Don’t—Defend Democracy: Evidence from Israel wi th Andrew O’Donohue moderated by Guy Priver DESCRIPTION: When does judicial behavior defend democracy by upholding cons traints on executive power? O’Donohue studies this question in Israel under Benjamin Netanyahu by analyzing quantitative data on over 16\,000 panel de cisions by Israel’s Supreme Court and qualitative interviews with high-rank ing judges\, lawyers\, and politicians. He theorizes that when judicial sel ection institutions disperse power (e.g.\, through a […] X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:

When does judicial behavior defend democra cy by upholding constraints on executive power? O'Donohue studies this ques tion in Israel under Benjamin Netanyahu by analyzing quantitative data on o ver 16\,000 panel decisions by Israel's Supreme Court and qualitative inter views with high-ranking judges\, lawyers\, and politicians. He theorizes th at when judicial selection institutions disperse power (e.g.\, through a su permajority requirement)\, they limit court capture by the executive and pr eserve judicial constraints on executive power. He further theorizes that j udicial allies\, or actors outside the judiciary who support anti-governmen t decisions\, explain variation in the judiciary's power to rule against th e executive and ensure executive compliance. He demonstrates the theory in Israel under Netanyahu and test the theory cross-nationally by using origin al data on judicial selection institutions in 139 countries. These findings illuminate when and why courts\, a key bulwark against modern democratic b acksliding\, succeed or fail in constraining illiberal executives.
And rew O'Donohue is the Carlson and Nelson Graduate Fellow at the Harvard Radc liffe Institute and a Ph.D. Candidate in Government at Harvard University\, as well as a Nonresident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for Internation al Peace. O'Donohue's research has been published in The Journal of Democra cy and Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Nexus\, as well as i n The Atlantic\, Foreign Affairs\, Foreign Policy\, and The Washington Post . His research studies law and courts\, democratic backsliding\, and Middle East politics\, with a focus on Israel and Turkey.
Moderated by Adan Ershied

LOCATION:Hauser Hall\; 105 Jackson Meeting Room GEO:0;0 ORGANIZER;CN="API User":MAILTO:api@law.harvard.edu URL;VALUE=URI:https://hls.harvard.edu/events/when-courts-do-and-dont-defend -democracy-evidence-from-israel-with-andrew-odonohue-moderated-by-adan-ersh ied/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 DTSTART:20260308T070000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE END:VCALENDAR