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UID:20260126T1647Z-1769446067.9914-EO-738289-1@10.73.6.187
STATUS:CONFIRMED
DTSTAMP:20260526T220343Z
CREATED:20260126T153503Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260519T185518Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260223T121500
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260223T131500
SUMMARY: *POSTPONED UNTIL MARCH 11* When Courts Do—and Don’t—Defend Democra
 cy: Evidence from Israel with Andrew O’Donohue moderated by Adan Ershied
DESCRIPTION: When does judicial behavior defend democracy by upholding cons
 traints on executive power? \;O’Donohue studies this question in Israel und
 er Benjamin Netanyahu by analyzing quantitative data on over 16\,000 panel 
 decisions by Israel’s Supreme Court and qualitative interviews with high-ra
 nking judges\, lawyers\, and politicians. He theorizes that when judicial s
 election institutions disperse power (e.g.\, through a […]
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html: <p>When does judicial behavior defend democra
 cy by upholding constraints on executive power? \;O'Donohue studies this qu
 estion in Israel under Benjamin Netanyahu by analyzing quantitative data on
  over 16\,000 panel decisions by Israel's Supreme Court and qualitative int
 erviews with high-ranking judges\, lawyers\, and politicians. He theorizes 
 that when judicial selection institutions disperse power (e.g.\, through a 
 supermajority requirement)\, they limit court capture by the executive and 
 preserve judicial constraints on executive power. O'Donohue further theoriz
 es that judicial allies\, or actors outside the judiciary who support anti-
 government decisions\, explain variation in the judiciary's power to rule a
 gainst the executive and ensure executive compliance. He demonstrates the t
 heory in Israel under Netanyahu and tests the theory cross-nationally by us
 ing original data on judicial selection institutions in 139 countries. Thes
 e findings illuminate when and why courts\, a key bulwark against modern de
 mocratic backsliding\, succeed or fail in constraining illiberal executives
 .<br />Andrew O'Donohue is the Carlson and Nelson Graduate Fellow at the Ha
 rvard Radcliffe Institute and a Ph.D. Candidate in Government at Harvard Un
 iversity\, as well as a Nonresident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for I
 nternational Peace. O'Donohue's research has been published in The Journal 
 of Democracy and Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Nexus\, as
  well as in The Atlantic\, Foreign Affairs\, Foreign Policy\, and The Washi
 ngton Post. His research studies law and courts\, democratic backsliding\, 
 and Middle East politics\, with a focus on Israel and Turkey.</p>
LOCATION:Hauser Hall\; 101 Borenstein Meeting Room
GEO:0;0
ORGANIZER;CN="API User":MAILTO:api@law.harvard.edu
URL;VALUE=URI:https://hls.harvard.edu/events/when-courts-do-and-dont-defend
 -democracy-evidence-from-israel-with-andrew-odonahue/
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