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  • Ruth L. Okediji, Rules of Power in an Age of Law: Process Opportunism and TRIPS Dispute Settlement, in Handbook of International Trade: Economic and Legal Analyses of Trade Policy and Institutions 42 (James Hartigan & Kwan Choi eds., 2005).

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    This second volume of the Handbook of International Trade focuses on the economic and legal analysis of international laws and institutions as they impact trade.

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    The Canada-Mexico International Workshop on Access and Benefit-sharing convened a broad range of experts in Cuernavaca, Mexico, October 24-27, 2004, to discuss a number of issues key to the negotiation, under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), of the International Regime on Access and Benefit-sharing (ABS).

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    This article briefly presents an account of bilateralism in international economic relations - encompassing intellectual property regulation - that suggests that the TRIPS Agreement should never have been understood as a crowning point of international intellectual property regulation. The article explores the implications of this possible reformulation of the theory and place of the TRIPS Agreement in international intellectual property law and policy. The author argues that the new bilateralism, while similar in form, serves a different agenda from the old bilateralism which relied principally on commercial agreements as a means to stabilize, formalize and advance interests ostensibly mutual to the contracting parties. Notwithstanding this different function, and in spite of the deployment of coercive measures enforced through unilateral trade policy, the author seeks to consider what, if any, real prospects for gain may exist for developing countries under the new bilateralism.

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    The broad question of how antitrust principles are effected in a legal regime that deliberately grants exclusive market rights to innovators is one that is particularly complex in the information era. The intellectual property/antitrust interface requires a careful and flexible balance between the acceptable effects of proprietary rights on static efficiency, and the anticipated welfare gains of dynamic efficiency. The long-term gains of this trade-off justify and reinforce the competitive framework as the immediate context in which policy makers must scrutinize the exploitation of intellectual property. However, competition policies cannot enhance welfare simply by broad exemptions, harmonized minimum principles, or striking isolated provisions in licensing agreements. The welfare models of trade, intellectual property, and antitrust require considerable adjustment within specific, national contexts to assure the welfare benefits associated with each regulatory order are obtainable. This requires balancing acts - between trade and competition, competition and intellectual property, and between the different measurements of welfare associated with each discipline.

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    Technological innovation is a predominant source of persistent economic growth. Endogenous factors, principally human capital, financial capital, and gover...

  • Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 819 (2003).

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  • Ruth L. Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 75 (2000).

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