Prerequisites: Familiarity with U.S. corporate law and a consumer's interest in the relevant finance literature.
Exam Type: No Exam
Seminar participants will be asked to present assigned articles and submit weekly memos evaluating their results and/or suggesting novel ways to explore their results.
This seminar reviews the literature on management and director turnover in U.S. public corporations. Topics to be addressed include the proximate causes of turnover (e.g., retirements, terminations, and takeovers); relationships between turnover and corporate attributes such as firm performance, size, and ownership structure; the relationship between managerial compensation and turnover; and the evolution of CEO and director turnover over time. Depending on available literature, the seminar may inquire into when turnover in the C-suite and the boardroom are "team" phenomena, including whether they sometimes correlate. Seminar readings will also address the implications of turnover for corporate governance. Should reformers encourage selective turnover by promoting term limits and fixed retirement ages? Alternatively, should boards to periodically disclose their succession planning to allow the market to assess the likely continuity of corporate leadership? And if so, should successors be named long before incumbent CEOs retire?
The seminar materials will include an accessible dataset. When data permit, participants will be asked to make testable predictions based on their informed intuitions. Some predictions may actually be tested after their proponents firmly commit. But no hands-on data skills are required.