Michael Meurer

Visiting Professor of Law

Spring 2017

Areeda 128

617-496-8843

Assistant: Lauren Faz / 617-495-7719

James Bessen & Michael Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 387 (2014).
Categories:
Property Law
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
Sub-Categories:
Litigation & Settlement
,
Intellectual Property - Patent & Trademark
Type: Article
Abstract
In the past, “non-practicing entities” (NPEs), popularly known as “patent trolls,” have helped small inventors profit from their inventions. Is this true today or, given the unprecedented levels of NPE litigation, do NPEs reduce innovation incentives? Using a survey of defendants and a database of litigation, this paper estimates the direct costs to defendants arising from NPE patent assertions. We estimate that firms accrued $29 billion of direct costs in 2011. Although large firms accrued over half of direct costs, most of the defendants were small or medium-sized firms. Moreover, an examination of publicly listed NPEs indicates that little of the direct costs represents a transfer to small inventors. This updated version of the paper includes a reply to critics.
James Bessen & Michael Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk (Princeton Univ. Press 2008).
Categories:
Property Law
Sub-Categories:
Intellectual Property - Patent & Trademark
Type: Book
Robert Marshall, Michael Meurer & Jean-Francois Richard, Litigation Settlement and Collusion, 109 Q. J. Econ. 213 (1994).
Categories:
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Litigation & Settlement
,
Law & Economics
,
Administrative Law & Agencies
Type: Article
Abstract
Private enforcement of regulatory policy is a significant feature of many government-sponsored contests, such as procurements. Although private enforcement is supposed to promote social welfare, we show that competitors can use it to achieve collusive outcomes. In a noncooperative duopoly setting, we show that the threat of litigation, and the possibility of settlement can dramatically affect ex ante competition in the relevant market. Essentially, the settlement process provides a legal mechanism for the exchange of side-payments, while the possibility of a court decision provides the plaintiff with a credible threat against the defendant so as to avert cheating. The result does not require repeated play, ex ante contracts, or other commitment devices. In the federal procurement context, we show that our results are robust to alterations in the court remedy, bargaining power of the litigants, and many other factors.

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Areeda 128

617-496-8843

Assistant: Lauren Faz / 617-495-7719