J. Mark Ramseyer

Mitsubishi Professor of Japanese Legal Studies

Hauser 204

617-496-4878

Assistant: Kim Peterson / 617-496-7244

Biography

Mark Ramseyer spent most of his childhood in provincial towns and cities in southern Japan, attending Japanese schools for K-6. He returned to the U.S. for college. Before attending law school, he studied Japanese history in graduate school. Ramseyer graduated from HLS in 1982. He clerked for the Hon. Stephen Breyer (then on the First Circuit), worked for two years at Sidley & Austin (in corporate tax), and studied as a Fulbright student at the University of Tokyo. After teaching at UCLA and the University of Chicago, he came to Harvard in 1998. He has also taught or co-taught courses at several Japanese universities (in Japanese). In his research, Ramseyer primarily studies Japanese law, and primarily from a law & economics perspective. In addition to a variety of Japanese law courses, he teaches the basic Corporations course. With Professors Klein and Bainbridge, he co-edits a Foundation Press casebook in the field.

Areas of Interest

Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Fable of the Keiretsu: Urban Legends of the Japanese Economy (Univ. Chi. Press 2006).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Corporate Law & Securities
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Banking
,
Finance
,
Business Organizations
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Book
Abstract
For Western economists and journalists, the most distinctive facet of the post-war Japanese business world has been the keiretsu, or the insular business alliances among powerful corporations. Within keiretsu groups, argue these observers, firms preferentially trade, lend money, take and receive technical and financial assistance, and cement their ties through cross-shareholding agreements. In The Fable of the Keiretsu, Yoshiro Miwa and J. Mark Ramseyer demonstrate that all this talk is really just urban legend. In their insightful analysis, the authors show that the very idea of the keiretsu was created and propagated by Marxist scholars in post-war Japan. Western scholars merely repatriated the legend to show the culturally contingent nature of modern economic analysis. Laying waste to the notion of keiretsu, the authors debunk several related “facts” as well: that Japanese firms maintain special arrangements with a “main bank,” that firms are systematically poorly managed, and that the Japanese government guided post-war growth. In demolishing these long-held assumptions, they offer one of the few reliable chronicles of the realities of Japanese business.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Measuring Judicial Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in Japan (Univ. Chi. Press 2003).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Book
Abstract
The role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election raised questions in the minds of many Americans about the relationships between judges and political influence; the following years saw equally heated debates over the appropriate role of political ideology in selecting federal judges. Legal scholars have always debated these questions—asking, in effect, how much judicial systems operate on merit and principle and how much they are shaped by politics. The Japanese Constitution, like many others, requires that all judges be "independent in the exercise of their conscience and bound only by this Constitution and its laws." Consistent with this requirement, Japanese courts have long enjoyed a reputation for vigilant independence—an idea challenged only occasionally, and most often anecdotally. But in this book, J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen use the latest statistical techniques to examine whether that reputation always holds up to scrutiny—whether, and to what extent, the careers of lower court judges can be manipulated to political advantage. On the basis of careful econometric analysis of career data for hundreds of judges, Ramseyer and Rasmusen find that Japanese politics do influence judicial careers, discreetly and indirectly: judges who decide politically charged cases in ways favored by the ruling party enjoy better careers after their decisions than might otherwise be expected, while dissenting judges are more likely to find their careers hampered by assignments to less desirable positions. Ramseyer and Rasmusen's sophisticated yet accessible analysis has much to offer anyone interested in either judicial independence or the application of econometric techniques in the social sciences.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Are Reactors Like Casinos? A Culture of Dependency in Japan (Univ. Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 798, Mar. 1, 2017).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Law & Economics
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Other
Abstract
Japanese communities with nuclear reactors have the reactors because they applied for them, and they applied for them for the money. Among Japanese municipalities, they were some of the most dysfunctional before the reactors had even arrived. Communities depend on young families for the social capital that holds them intact, and these were the communities from which those families had already begun to leave. After the reactors arrived, young families continued to disappear. Unemployment rose. Divorce rates climbed. And in time, the communities had little -- other than reactor-revenue -- to which they could turn.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Nuclear Power and the Mob: Extortion in Japan, 13 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 487 (2016).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Criminal Law & Procedure
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Environmental Law
Sub-Categories:
Organized Crime
,
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Energy & Utilities Law
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Nuclear reactors entail massive nontransferrable site-specific investments. The resulting appropriable quasi-rents offer the mob a lucrative target. In exchange for large fees, it can either promise to “protect” the utility (and silence the reactor's local opponents) or “extort” from it (and desist from inciting those opponents). Using prefecture-level Japanese panel data covering the years 1980 to 2010, I find that extortion rates rise when a utility announces plans to build a reactor. The evidence is consistent with a straightforward account: once news about a utility's plans to build a new reactor leaks, the mob moves in to appropriate the large quasi-rents from the utility, and stays to do what it does everywhere else—extort regular payments from local businesses.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Lowering the Bar to Raise the Bar: Licensing Difficulty and Attorney Quality in Japan, 41 J. Japanese Stud. 113 (2015).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Legal Education
Type: Article
Abstract
By easing the difficulty of the Japanese bar-exam equivalent, recent changes increased the quality of young lawyers. The result is counterintuitive, but a relaxation in a licensing standard can have this effect if it lowers the costs to taking a test enough to increase the number and quality of the people willing to go to the trouble of sitting for it. We explore the theoretical circumstances under which this phenomenon can occur and discuss the evidence that this is indeed what happened in Japan.
Lisa Bernstein, Alan Morrison & J. Mark Ramseyer, Private Orderings, 7 J. Legal Analysis 247 (2015).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Dispute Resolution
,
Litigation & Settlement
,
Negotiation & Alternative Dispute Resolution
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
Type: Article
J. Mark Ramseyer, Social Capital and the Formal Legal System: Evidence from Prefecture-Level Data in Japan, 7 J. Legal Analysis 421 (2015).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Dispute Resolution
,
Litigation & Settlement
,
Negotiation & Alternative Dispute Resolution
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Empirical Legal Studies
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Verifiable proxies for social capital potentially provide an empirically tractable way to identify environments where social norms both constrain behavior and substitute for judicial enforcement. Using regression and factor analysis with Japanese prefecture-level data, I explore several aspects of this possibility. I first note that people in prefectures with high levels of social capital more readily comply with a wide range of low-level legal mandates. Conditional on levels of economic welfare, I further find that: (i) firms in prefectures with low levels of social capital are more likely to default on their contracts, (ii) residents in low social-capital prefectures are more likely to litigate, (iii) creditors of distressed debtors in low social-capital prefectures are more likely to petition a court for enforcement orders, and (iv) distressed debtors in low social-capital prefectures are more likely to file in court for bankruptcy protection.
J. Mark Ramseyer, The Fable of Land Reform: Leases and Credit Markets in Occupied Japan, 24 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 934 (2015).
Categories:
Environmental Law
,
Property Law
,
Banking & Finance
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Finance
,
Agriculture Law
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Developing & Emerging Nations
,
Real Estate
,
Property Rights
Type: Article
Abstract
Development officials and scholars routinely argue that land reform can raise productivity. It may not always do so, they write, but it can—and during 1947–1950 in Japan it did. Land reform may sometimes raise productivity, but it did not raise it in Japan. The claim that it did is a fable, a tale people tell and re-tell only because they wish it were true. A lease is a credit transaction—a way for local elites (tied to local information networks in ways that banks can never be) to extend funds to farmers. Elites could lend money directly, but would need to create a security interest to protect their loans. Doing so requires legal procedures, however, and most local elites in prewar Japan lacked the university education necessary to manipulate those procedures. By contrast, a lease lets local elites protect their funds simply by retaining the right to evict tenants who fail to pay. As such, it represents a way for investors and farmers jointly to economize on credit market costs. The Japanese land reform program effectively banned this transaction-cost economizing credit-market strategy, expropriated the wealth of the investors who used it—and cut the rate of growth in agricultural productivity.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Measuring Voter Ideology: Descriptive Regression Measurement of the Left-Right Spectrum (June 9, 2015).
Categories:
Government & Politics
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Elections & Voting
,
Congress & Legislation
Type: Other
Abstract
For scholars studying the political attitudes of the general public, someone’s position on the ideological spectrum is a good place to start. Typically, scholars identify that position through factor analysis on survey questions, making the assumption that the most important artificially constructed factor indicates the person’s position on the liberal-conservative spectrum. The leading attitudinal surveys, however— the GSS, the CCES, and the ANES— include a variable giving a respondent’s self-identified ideology, a variable given no special prominence by factor analysis. We suggest a new ideology measure: the individual’s fitted value from a regression of self-identified ideology on other variables. We describe various ways to choose those other variables. This approach gives proper priority to the usefulness of self-reported ideology. It lets us test whether voters identify their own ideology through identity-group variables; avoids the bias introduced in choosing which issue variables to include in factor analysis; and shows which positions the average American— as opposed to the analyst— thinks define “liberal” and “conservative”.
Bruce E. Aronson, Kenneth Ayotte, Takaaki Eguchi, David Gamage, Mark P. Gergen, Gen Goto, Benjamin E. Hermalin, Yohsuke Higashi, Akio Hoshi, Hidefusa Iida, Hideshi Itoh, Takahito Kato, Nobuo Matsuki, Manabu Matsunaka, Curtis J. Milhaupt, Hiroshi Mitoma, Hideaki Miyajima, Sadakazu Osaki, J. Mark Ramseyer, Shruti Rana, Roberta Romano, Takuji Saito, Kenichi Sekiguchi, Masakazu Shirai, Zenichi Shishido, Shinjiro Takagi, Wataru Tanaka, Takashi Toichi, Akira Tokosu, Hideaki Umetsu, J. H. Verkerke, Tetsuya Watanabe, and Noriyuki Yanagawa, Enterprise Law Conference of 2014: Edited Transcript (September 24, 2014).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Consumer Finance
,
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Labor & Employment
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Taxation
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Banking
,
Commercial Law
,
Finance
,
Shareholders
,
Mergers & Acquisitions
,
Securities Law & Regulation
,
Corporate Governance
,
Corporate Bankruptcy & Reorganization
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Employment Practice
,
Retirement Benefits & Social Security
,
Labor Law
,
Tax Policy
,
Taxation - Corporate
,
Taxation - Federal
,
Taxation - Personal Income
Type: Article
Abstract
Two persistent questions of enterprise law are raised and addressed: First, how does law matter to business practice? Second, how can we make law that stimulates economic efficiency? These questions are difficult to answer because of two important complementarities: the complementarity between areas of law within a country’s legal regime and the complementarity between law and other social environments such as markets and social norms. Over the course of the two-day conference, academics and practitioners from the U.S. and Japan in the areas of corporate law, securities regulation, labor law (including both employment protection law and labor union law), bankruptcy law, and tax law investigate the ways that enterprise law affects practice complementarily with markets and social norms. A key analytical framework is introduced, in which the business enterprise is viewed as an incentive mechanism among the four indispensable capital providers of the firm: management, employees, shareholders, and creditors. Only through close attention to the incentive bargain between these four players can optimal legislative design and economic efficiency be achieved.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Exclusive Dealing: Before, Bork, and Beyond, 57 J.L. & Econ. S145 (2014).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Banking & Finance
,
Corporate Law & Securities
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Antitrust & Competition Law
,
Law & Economics
Type: Article
Abstract
Antitrust scholars have come to accept the basic ideas about exclusive dealing that Bork articulated in The Antitrust Paradox. Indeed, they have even extended his list of reasons why exclusive dealing can promote economic efficiency. Yet they have also taken up his challenge to explain when exclusive dealing might possibly cause harm and have modeled a variety of special cases where it does. Some (albeit not all) of these are sufficiently plausible to be useful to prosecutors and judges.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Litigation and Social Capital: Divorces and Traffic Accidents in Japan, 11 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 39 (2014).
Categories:
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Dispute Resolution
,
Litigation & Settlement
,
Negotiation & Alternative Dispute Resolution
,
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Using regression and factor analysis with prefecture-level data, I ask whether Japanese in communities with high levels of “social capital” more readily settle their disputes out of court. Although studies of litigation rates often measure suits per capita, the more appropriate measure may involve suits per “dispute.” We lack information about the number of disputes in many fields, but we do have it for Japanese divorces and traffic accidents—and I focus on those two sets of disputes. Disputes over divorce and traffic accidents differ fundamentally, and social capital does not lower litigation rates among either. I find that: (1) couples in communities with low social capital are more apt to divorce; (2) couples in low-social-capital communities are not more likely to litigate their disputes; (3) couples in communities with more lawyers are not more likely to litigate their divorces; and (4) parties in communities with low social capital are not more likely to litigate their disputes over traffic accidents; but (5) parties in communities with more lawyers are indeed more likely to litigate their disputes over those accidents.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Biases that Blind: Professor Hyman and the University, 2014 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1229 (2014).
Categories:
Legal Profession
,
Health Care
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Health Law & Policy
,
Legal Education
,
Legal History
Type: Article
Abstract
This Essay is a response to Professor Hyman’s piece, Why Did Law Professors Misunderestimate the Lawsuits Against PPACA. In this Essay, Ramseyer argues that the statements made by law professors about the constitutionality of the PPACA often reflected partisan loyalty more than thoughtful legal analysis.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Liability for Defective Products: Comparative Hypotheses and Evidence from Japan, 61 Am. J. Comp. L. 617 (2013).
Categories:
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Torts - Product Liability
,
Empirical Legal Studies
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Americans file 80,000 product liability suits a year; Japanese file perhaps 100-300; and most countries more closely resemble Japan than the United States. Based on reports and articles from forty-five countries, Mathias Reimann has advanced several thoughtful and subtle hypotheses about this contrast. In this article, I apply Reimann's hypotheses to Japan and explore what they might tell us about law in the two countries. As Reimann suggested, the reason for the Japanese-American contrast does not lie in legal doctrine: on the substantive law of products liability, the United States and Japan are quite close. Instead, the reasons for the contrast seem to turn on aspects of American procedure that encourage meritless demands. Litigation rates are not lower in Japan because the law prevents victims from recovering their damages; Japanese law does not deter valid claims. Instead, the rates are higher in the United States because American law helps claimants collect amounts to which they are not legally entitled.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Talent Matters: Judicial Productivity and Speed in Japan, 32 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 38 (2012).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Legal Profession
,
Government & Politics
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Torts - Negligence
,
Litigation & Settlement
,
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Legal Services
Type: Article
Abstract
To study the determinants of judicial productivity and speed (measured by published opinions), I examine all 348 trial-court civil medical malpractice opinions published in Japan between 1995 and 2004. For comparative purposes, I add 120 randomly selected civil judgments from the same period. The data cover 706 judges (about a third of the Japanese bench). I find: (A) Productivity correlates with apparent intellectual ability and effort. The judges who attended the most selective universities, who passed the bar exam most quickly, and who were chosen by the courts for an elite career track publish the most opinions. (B) Adjudicatory speed correlates with apparent ability and effort too, but institutional experience counts as well. As the courts acquired increasing experience with malpractice cases, the pace of adjudication quickened.
John R. Lott, Jr., J. Mark Ramseyer & Jeffrey Standen, Peer Effects in Affirmative Action: Evidence from Law Student Performance, 31 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 1 (2011).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Legal Education
Type: Article
Abstract
In the Grutter case, Justice O'Connor suggested that universities could justifiably try to enroll a "critical mass" of minority students. Enroll fewer than that "critical mass," reason some observers, and minority students will feel too marginalized to perform at their highest levels. In this article, we test whether minority students perform better with other students from their ethnic group in a class or school. To do so, we assemble data on the ethnicity and performance of each student in all classes at two law schools - for three years at one, and for 16 years at the other. Although these schools enrolled a smaller fraction of African-Americans than most law schools, they are located in states with a much smaller fraction of African-Americans than in the United States as a whole. There is also a large amount of variation in the percent African-American across classes. At these schools, we find no consistent evidence that having additional students from one's ethnic group raises a student's performance. Instead, we find some evidence that having additional ethnic peers lowers performance - albeit by a very small amount.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Book Review, 66 Monumenta Nipponica 381 (2011) (reviewing Mark D. West, Lovesick Japan: Sex, Marriage, Romance, Law).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Family Law
Sub-Categories:
Domestic Relations
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Minoru Nakazato & J. Mark Ramseyer, In Memoriam, Oliver Oldman, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1296 (2009).
Categories:
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
Legal Education
,
Biography & Tribute
Type: Article
Distribution in Japan (Yoshiro Miwa, Kiyohiko G. Nishimura & J. Mark Ramseyer eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Economics
,
Contracts
,
Commercial Law
,
Finance
,
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Corporate Law
,
Business Organizations
,
Corporate Governance
,
Law & Economics
Type: Book
Abstract
Several years have passed since the 'store wars' over barriers to foreign products at Japanese distribution firms. Yet among English-speaking readers, how these firms operate remains a puzzle. In this book, the best Japanese scholars in their fields attempt to unravel that puzzle. Avoiding culture-based explanations, they employ a systematic and rigorous economic logic---yet, since they also avoid mathematical notation, the argument remains accessible to generalist readers. Collectively, the authors make four basic points: * Within a country, distribution is less similar than it appears. Not only does it vary enormously across industries, but it often varies within a given industry as well. * Across countries, distribution is less diverse than it appears. Although appearances sometimes suggest major cross-national contrasts, on more careful analysis the differences often disappear. * Distribution sometimes depends on the product involved. Because distribution functions as the principal means by which manufacturers acquire information about consumer preferences, the character of distribution can depend crucially both on demand patterns and on manufacturing technology. * In the absence of regulatory intervention, distribution generally will be efficient and non-exclusionary. Regulation usually introduces inefficiency and often creates barriers to entry. Importantly, however, the targets of exclusion will less often involve foreign than domestic competitors. To illustrate these points, the authors draw on both analyses that cross various sectors and analyses that are specific to sectors; they study both regulated and unregulated industries; they describe industries with extensive imports, industries with extensive exports, and industries with neither; they examine the effect of technological change; and they introduce a variety of case studies, from agriculture and automobiles to electrical appliances and apparel.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Japanese Law: An Economic Approach (U. Chi. Press 1999).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Banking & Finance
,
Property Law
,
Consumer Finance
,
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Criminal Law & Procedure
,
Government & Politics
,
Taxation
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Consumer Contracts
,
Sentencing & Punishment
,
Corporate Law
,
Corporate Governance
,
Securities Law & Regulation
,
Litigation & Settlement
,
Practice & Procedure
,
Torts
,
Housing Law
,
Law & Economics
,
Administrative Law & Agencies
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Property Rights
,
Tax Policy
,
Taxation - Personal Income
,
Taxation - Corporate
Type: Book
Abstract
In this introduction to Japanese law, J. Mark Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato combine an economic approach with a clear and often amusing account of the law itself to challenge commonly held ideas about the law. Arguing against such things as the assumption that Japanese law differs from law in the United States and the idea that law plays only a trivial role in Japan or is culturally determined, this book will be recognized as a major contribution to the understanding of Japanese law.
J. Mark. Ramseyer, Odd Markets in Japanese History: Law and Economic Growth (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Property Law
,
Legal Profession
,
Environmental Law
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Banking & Finance
,
Consumer Finance
,
Family Law
,
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Labor & Employment
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Consumer Contracts
,
Business Organizations
,
Corporate Governance
,
Torts
,
Law & Economics
,
Water Law
,
Children's Law & Welfare
,
Domestic Relations
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Employment Practice
,
Legal History
,
Property Rights
Type: Book
Abstract
Employing a rational-choice approach, Professor Ramseyer studies the impact of Japanese law on economic growth in Japan. Toward that end, the author investigates the way law governed various markets, and the way that people negotiated contracts within those markets. Findings reveal that the legal system generally promoted mutually advantageous deals, and that people generally negotiated in ways that shrewdly promoted their private best interests. Whether in the markets for indentured servants, prostitutes, or marriage partners, this study reports little evidence of either age- or gender-related exploitation.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Frances McCall Rosenbluth, The Politics of Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan (Cambridge Univ. Press 1995).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Comparative Law
,
Legal History
Type: Book
Abstract
This book examines a key question of modern Japanese politics: why the Meiji oligarchs were unable to design institutions capable of protecting their power. The authors question why the oligarchs chose the political institutions they did, and what the consequences of those choices were for Japan's political competition, economic development, and diplomatic relations. Indeed, they argue, it was the oligarchs' very inability to agree among themselves on how to rule that prompted them to cut the military loose from civilian control--a decision that was to have disastrous consequences not only for Japan but for the rest of the world.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace (Harv. Univ. Press 1993).
Categories:
Government & Politics
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Politics & Political Theory
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Comparative Law
,
Foreign Law
Type: Book
Abstract
Mark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth show how rational-choice theory can be applied to Japanese politics. Using the concept of principal and agent, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth construct a persuasive account of political relationships in Japan. In doing so, they demonstrate that political considerations and institutional arrangements reign in what, to most of the world, looks like an independently powerful bureaucratic state.

Current Courses

Course Catalog View

Hauser 204

617-496-4878

Assistant: Kim Peterson / 617-496-7244