Tara L. Grove

Visiting Professor of Law

Fall 2017

Griswold 208

617-496-4535

Assistant: Anna Kim Reilly / 617-495-4863

Biography

Tara Leigh Grove is a Professor of Law at William and Mary Law School. She graduated summa cum laude from Duke University, and magna cum laude from Harvard Law School, where she served as the Supreme Court Chair of the Harvard Law Review. Professor Grove’s research focuses on the federal judiciary and the constitutional separation of powers. She has published with such prestigious law journals as the Harvard Law Review, Columbia Law Review, University of Chicago Law Review, New York University Law Review, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Cornell Law Review, and Vanderbilt Law Review.

Professor Grove’s articles are cited and discussed in leading Federal Courts casebooks, and her scholarship has received other national recognition. For example, Grove’s article, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 250 (2012), received the award for Best Article of 2012 by an untenured professor from the Federal Courts Section of the Association of American Law Schools. Her article, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1311 (2014), was one of three papers selected for the New Voices in Civil Justice Workshop at Vanderbilt University Law School. Grove was also elected to serve as the Chair of the Federal Courts Section of the Association of American Law Schools from 2014-2015.

In both 2014 and 2017, Professor Grove received the Plumeri Award for Faculty Excellence from the College of William and Mary. In 2016, Grove received the Alumni Fellowship Award, which is conferred annually on one graduate school professor at the College for excellence in teaching. Grove was also awarded the Robert and Elizabeth Scott Research Professorship for the 2015-2016 academic year, and the Cabell Research Professorship for the 2016-2017 academic year. In 2014, Grove participated in a TEDx Event at the College of William and Mary, where she gave a talk entitled The Executive’s Duty to Enforce the Law.

Prior to law school, Grove taught English in Utsunomiya, Japan. Following law school, Grove clerked for Judge Emilio Garza on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. She then spent four years as an appellate attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice, where she argued fifteen cases in the courts of appeals. As part of her transition to legal academia, Grove served as a Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School. During the fall semester 2012, Grove was a visiting professor at Northwestern University School of Law.

Areas of Interest

Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1311 (2014).
Categories:
Constitutional Law
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Congress & Legislation
,
Executive Office
,
Separation of Powers
Type: Article
Abstract
The Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that standing doctrine is a “bedrock” requirement only of Article III. Accordingly, both jurists and scholars have assumed that the standing of the executive branch and the legislature, like that of other parties, depends solely on Article III. But I argue that these commentators have overlooked a basic constitutional principle: Federal institutions must have affirmative authority for their actions, including the power to bring suit or appeal in federal court. Article III defines the federal “judicial Power” and does not purport to confer any authority on the executive branch or the legislature. Executive and legislative standing instead depend in large part on the provisions conferring power on those institutions ― principally, Article II and Article I. This basic insight has important implications. I argue that the Take Care Clause of Article II helps both to explain the breadth and also to define the limits of executive standing. The executive has standing only insofar as it has an Article II power and duty to enforce and defend federal law on behalf of the federal government. The Take Care Clause does not, however, confer standing when the executive no longer asserts that law enforcement interest ― when it declines to defend a federal law. Article I, for its part, does not confer any power on Congress to enforce or defend federal laws in court. Accordingly, contrary to the assumption of many scholars, Congress lacks standing to represent the United States in place of the executive. The Supreme Court has entirely overlooked these questions of institutional power in considering issues of executive or legislative standing, including most recently in the litigation over the Defense of Marriage Act. Article III cannot confer power on the executive or the legislature that Article II or Article I denies.
Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 929 (2013).
Categories:
Constitutional Law
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Congress & Legislation
,
Federalism
,
Supreme Court of the United States
Type: Article
Abstract
Scholars have long treated the Exceptions Clause of Article III as a serious threat to the Supreme Court’s central constitutional function: establishing definitive and uniform rules of federal law. This Article argues that scholars have overlooked an important function of the Clause. Congress has repeatedly used its broad “exceptions power” to facilitate, not to undermine, the Supreme Court’s constitutional role. Drawing on insights from social science, this Article asserts that Congress has an incentive to use its control over federal jurisdiction to promote the Court’s role in settling disputed federal questions. Notably, this argument has considerable historical support. When the Supreme Court’s mandatory appellate docket grew to the point that it was unmanageable for a single tribunal, Congress responded by exercising its authority under the Exceptions Clause. Congress made “exceptions” to the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction and replaced it with discretionary review via writs of certiorari—precisely so that the Court could concentrate its limited resources on resolving important federal questions. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, Congress has often used its broad exceptions power to safeguard the Supreme Court’s role in the constitutional scheme.
Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 869 (2011).
Categories:
Constitutional Law
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Congress & Legislation
,
Federalism
,
Supreme Court of the United States
,
Courts
Type: Article
Abstract
Scholars have long debated Congress’s power to curb federal jurisdiction and have consistently assumed that the constitutional limits on Congress’s authority (if any) must be judicially enforceable and found in the text and structure of Article III. In this Article, I challenge that fundamental assumption. I argue that the primary constitutional protection for the federal judiciary lies instead in the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I. These Article I lawmaking procedures give competing political factions (even political minorities) considerable power to “veto” legislation. Drawing on recent social science and legal scholarship, I argue that political factions are particularly likely to use their structural veto to block jurisdiction-stripping legislation favored by their opponents. Notably, this structural argument is supported by the history of congressional control over federal jurisdiction. When the federal courts have issued controversial opinions that trigger wide public condemnation, supporters of the judiciary–even when they were only a political minority in Congress–repeatedly used their structural veto to block jurisdiction-stripping proposals. This structural approach also provides one answer to a puzzle that has particularly troubled scholars: whether there are any constitutional limits on Congress’s authority to make “exceptions” to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The structural safeguards of Article I have proven especially effective at preventing encroachments on the Supreme Court’s Article III appellate review power.

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