Oren Bar-Gill

William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law and Economics

Griswold 310

617-495-4623

Assistant: Patricia Fazzone / 617-496-2075

Biography

Oren Bar-Gill’s scholarship focuses on the law and economics of contracts and contracting. His publications include: SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (Oxford University Press, 2012); "Exchange Efficiency with Weak Ownership Rights” (with Nicola Persico), which was published in the American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; “Product Use Information and the Limits of Voluntary Disclosure” (with Oliver Board), which appeared in the American Law and Economics Review (2012); "Consent and Exchange" (with Lucian Bebchuk), which appeared in the Journal of Legal Studies (2010); "The Law, Economics, and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts," which appeared in the Cornell Law Review (2009); "The Prisoners' (Plea Bargain) Dilemma" (with Omri Ben-Shahar), which appeared in the Journal of Legal Analysis (2009); "Making Credit Safer" (with Elizabeth Warren), which appeared in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review (2008); "Bundling and Consumer Misperception," which appeared in the University of Chicago Law Review (2006); “Credible Coercion” (with Omri Ben-Shahar), which appeared in the Texas Law Review (2005); “Seduction by Plastic,” which appeared in the Northwestern University Law Review (2004); and “The Law of Duress and the Economics of Credible Threats” (with Omri Ben-Shahar), which appeared in the Journal of Legal Studies (2004).

Bar-Gill joined Harvard Law School in July 2014 from New York University School of Law, where he was the Evelyn and Harold Meltzer Professor of Law and Economics. Bar-Gill holds a B.A. (economics), LL.B., M.A. (law & economics) and Ph.D. (economics) from Tel-Aviv University, as well as an LL.M. and S.J.D. from Harvard Law School.

Bar-Gill is the recipient of the American Law Institute’s Young Scholars Medal (in 2011). He currently serves (together with Omri Ben-Shahar and Florencia Marotta-Wurgler) as Reporter for the Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts.

Areas of Interest

Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets (Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Economics
,
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Consumer Protection Law
,
Consumer Contracts
Type: Book
Abstract
Consumers routinely enter into long-term contracts with providers of goods and services - from credit cards, mortgages, cell phones, insurance, TV, and internet services to household appliances, theatre and sports events, health clubs, magazine subscriptions, transportation, and more. Across these consumer markets certain design features of contracts are recurrent, and puzzling. Why do sellers design contracts to provide short-term benefits and impose long-term costs? Why are low introductory prices so common? Why are the contracts themselves so complex, with numerous fees and interest rates, tariffs and penalties? Seduction by Contract explains how consumer contracts emerge from the interaction between market forces and consumer psychology. Consumers are short-sighted and optimistic, so sellers compete to offer short-term benefits, while imposing long-term costs. Consumers are imperfectly rational, so sellers hide the true costs of products and services in complex contracts. Consumers are seduced by contracts that increase perceived benefits, without actually providing more benefits, and decrease perceived costs, without actually reducing the costs that consumers ultimately bear. Competition does not help this behavioural market failure. It may even exacerbate it. Sellers, operating in a competitive market, have no choice but to align contract design with the psychology of consumers. A high-road seller who offers what she knows to be the best contract will lose business to the low-road seller who offers what the consumer mistakenly believes to be the best contract. Put bluntly, competition forces sellers to exploit the biases and misperceptions of their customers. Seduction by Contract argues that better legal policy can help consumers and enhance market efficiency. Disclosure mandates provide a promising avenue for regulatory intervention. Simple, aggregate disclosures can help consumers make better choices. Comprehensive disclosures can facilitate the work of intermediaries, enabling them to better advise consumers. Effective disclosure would expose the seductive nature of consumer contracts and, as a result, reduce sellers' incentives to write inefficient contracts. Developing its explanation through a general framework and detailed case studies of three major consumer markets (credit cards, mortgages, and cell phones), Seduction by Contract is an accessible introduction to the law and economics of consumer contracts, and a powerful critique of current regulatory policy.
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Law of Duress and the Economics of Credible Threats, 33 J. Legal Stud. 391 (2004).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
Sub-Categories:
Economics
,
Contracts
,
Dispute Resolution
,
Remedies
Type: Article
Abstract
This paper argues that enforcement of an agreement, reached under a threat to refrain from dealing, should be conditioned solely on the threat's credibility. When a credible threat exists, enforcement promotes social welfare and the threatened party's interests. If agreements backed by credible threats were not enforceable, the threatening party would not extort them and would instead refrain from dealing—to the threatened party's detriment. The doctrine of duress, which invalidates such agreements, hurts the coerced party. By denying enforcement when a credible threat exists, the duress doctrine precludes the threatened party from making the commitment necessary to reach agreement. Paradoxically, the duress doctrine renders performance less likely, thereby reducing incentives to invest. The paper suggests that courts should replace the duress methodology with a credibility inquiry. It discusses factors that would be relevant under such an inquiry. Finally, it demonstrates applications of this approach to leading contract modification cases.
Oren Bar-Gill, Consumer Contracts: Law, Economics and Psychology, in Law and Economics of the Mortgage Market (Fernando Gomez & Juanjo Ganuza eds., forthcoming 2017).
Categories:
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Consumer Contracts
Type: Book
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Optimal Defaults in Consumer Markets, 45 J. Legal Studies S137 (2016).
Categories:
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Consumer Contracts
,
Consumer Bankruptcy Law
Type: Article
Abstract
The design of default provisions in consumer contracts involves an aspect that does not normally arise in other contexts. Unlike commercial parties, consumers have only limited information about the content of the default rule and how it fits with their preference. Inefficient default rules may not lead to opt outs when they deal with technical aspects consumers rarely experience and over which consumers’ preferences are defined only crudely. This paper develops a model in which consumers are uninformed about their preferences, but can acquire costly information and then choose a contract term that best matches their preferences. The paper explores the optimal design of default rules in such environments, and how it differs from the existing conceptions of efficient default rule design.
Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin E. Davis, (Mis)perceptions of Law in Consumer Markets (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 859, 2016).
Categories:
Consumer Finance
,
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Consumer Protection Law
Type: Article
Abstract
There are good reasons to believe that consumers’ behavior is sometimes influenced by systematic misperceptions of legal norms that govern product quality. Consumers might misperceive specific rules, such as those found in food safety regulations, as well as more general standards, such as the unconscionability doctrine or limitations on waivers of default substantive or procedural rights. When demand is affected by systematic misperceptions of legal norms, lawmakers may be able to maximize welfare by deviating from the legal standard that would be optimal in the absence of misperception. We use a formal model to characterize these optimal deviations under different legal regimes (with different types and magnitudes of sanctions). In particular, should the legal standard be adjusted to correct or confirm the misperception? For instance, if consumers under-estimate the level of legal protection is it desirable to raise the legal standard to correct the misperception? Or should lawmakers lower the legal standard to confirm the misperception?
Oren Bar-Gill & Christoph Engel, Bargaining in the Absence of Property Rights: An Experiment, 59 J. of L. & Econ. 477 (2016).
Categories:
Property Law
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Law & Economics
,
Personal Property
,
Property Rights
Type: Article
Abstract
The Coase theorem posits: If [1] property rights are perfect, [2] contracts are enforceable, [3] preferences are common knowledge, and [4] transaction costs are zero, then the initial allocation of property rights only matters for distribution, not for efficiency. In this paper we claim that condition [1] can be dropped and show experimentally that this is also empirically true. This also holds when we frame taking as “stealing”, and when the initial possessor has to work for the good.
Oren Bar-Gill & Nicola Persico, Exchange Efficiency with Weak Ownership Rights, 8 Am. Econ. J.: Microeconomics, no. 4, Nov. 2016, at 230.
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Property Law
Sub-Categories:
Law & Economics
,
Personal Property
,
Property Rights
,
Intellectual Property - Copyright
,
Intellectual Property - Patent & Trademark
Type: Article
Abstract
We show that efficient exchange obtains independently of the degree to which a legal system protects the rights of owners. We study a number of different legal rules, including property rules (strong protection), liability rules (any party can take the owner's asset but must pay a legally-determined compensation), and even rules that protect the owner’s interests very weakly (liability rules with a very low compensation level). Efficiency is obtained as long as the degree of protection provided by law and by the bargaining protocol is not "too" inversely correlated with a party’s valuation of the asset.
Oren Bar-Gill, Information and Paternalism, in Choice Architecture in Democracies, Exploring the Legitimacy of Nudging (Alexandra Kemmerer, Christoph Mollers, Maximilian Steinbeis & Gerhard Wagner eds., Hart/Nomos 2016).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Consumer Protection Law
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Law & Economics
Type: Book
Oren Bar-Gill, On Phishing and Seduction: Law, Economics and Psychology in Consumer Markets (PolicyShop Blog, Oct. 5, 2015).
Categories:
Consumer Finance
,
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
Type: Other
Abstract
In an important new book, Phishing for Phools, George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller demonstrate, through a series of examples, the prevalence of manipulation (“phishing”) in consumer markets and in society more broadly. Manipulation is inevitable, they argue. It is the equilibrium outcome. High-road sellers will soon lose out to their low-road competitors and disappear from the market. You must manipulate to survive: phish or perish. As Akerlof and Shiller recognize, their book builds on a now rich literature in behavioral economics. Their contribution lies in the generality of their claims and in their ambition to present market failure – the bad phishing equilibrium – as the rule, rather than the exception. This short post does two things: First, it discusses consumer contracts as an example of phishing. Second, it considers different policy responses to the unhappy picture that Akerlof and Shiller so vividly paint.
Oren Bar-Gill, Price Caps in Multiprice Markets, 44 J. Legal Stud. 453 (2015).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Consumer Protection Law
Type: Article
Abstract
Many consumer markets feature a multidimensional price. A policy maker—a legislator, a regulator, or a court—concerned about the level of one price dimension may decide to cap this price. How will such a price cap affect other price dimensions? Will the overall effect be good or bad for consumers? For social welfare? Price caps can be beneficial when sellers set prices in response to consumers’ misperception. The scope for welfare-enhancing regulation depends on the type (and direction) of the underlying misperception and on market structure.
Oren Bar-Gill, Big Data, Privacy and Price Discrimination: A Behavioral Economics Perspective (Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. Blog, Apr. 26, 2015).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Consumer Finance
,
Technology & Law
Sub-Categories:
Commercial Law
,
Consumer Protection Law
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Law & Economics
,
Information Privacy & Security
Type: Other
Abstract
The goal of this post is to highlight one particular problem raised by the Big Data revolution – the problem of price discrimination. Price discrimination describes a situation where a seller, usually a monopolist (or, more generally, a seller with some degree of market power), charges different prices to different consumers for the very same product or service. The seller seeks to identify her customer’s willingness to pay, and then charges higher prices to those consumers who are willing to pay more.
Oren Bar-Gill, Guilty Pleasures, The New Rambler, Mar. 9, 2015 (reviewing John Bronsteen, Chrisopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Happiness and the Law (2014)).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Law & Public Policy
,
Legal Theory & Philosophy
Type: Article
Abstract
Happiness and the Law is an important book. Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur (BBM) provide a well-written, thought-provoking, rigorous introduction to hedonic psychology and its many potential applications in law and policy. Numerous lessons are already ripe for consumption by policymakers. Other ideas set the stage for a fruitful research agenda that will influence policy in years to come.
Oren Bar-Gill, Guilty Pleasures, New Rambler Rev., Mar. 9, 2015 (reviewing John Bronsteen, Chrisopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Happiness and the Law (2014)).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Law & Public Policy
,
Legal Theory & Philosophy
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Law & Mind Sciences
Type: Other
Abstract
Happiness and the Law is an important book. Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur (BBM) provide a well-written, thought-provoking, rigorous introduction to hedonic psychology and its many potential applications in law and policy. Numerous lessons are already ripe for consumption by policymakers. Other ideas set the stage for a fruitful research agenda that will influence policy in years to come.
Oren Bar-Gill, Defending (Smart) Disclosure: A Comment on “More Than You Wanted to Know", 11 Jerusalem Rev. Legal Stud. (2015).
Categories:
Government & Politics
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Consumer Protection Law
,
Administrative Law & Agencies
Type: Article
Abstract
Ben-Shahar and Schneider have written an important book: "More Than You Wanted to Know." They develop a powerful critique of a prevalent regulatory technique: Mandatory Disclosure. They argue that disclosure does not work and that it cannot be fixed. Lawmakers should, therefore, abandon this ineffective and, possibly, harmful regulatory approach and look elsewhere or … do nothing. While I agree with almost everything they write, when the authors discuss, and critique, “scores” toward the end of Chapter 8, I must respectfully disagree. This article focuses on scores, presenting their benefits and costs and, as examples, focusing specifically on three types. I also seek common ground between my position and that of the authors, and conclude by venturing beyond scores to discuss the promise of full disclosure targeted at intermediaries, rather than consumers.
Oren Bar-Gill, Information and Paternalism, in Choice Architecture in Democracies, Exploring the Legitimacy of Nudging (Alexandra Kemmerer, Christoph Möllers, Maximillian Steinbeis & Gerhard Wagner eds. 2015).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Law & Economics
Type: Book
Oren Bar-Gill, Consumer Transactions, in The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law 465 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2014).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Commercial Law
,
Consumer Protection Law
,
Consumer Contracts
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Law & Economics
Type: Book
Abstract
Consumer transactions differ from the archetypal arm’s-length contract on which both classical contract law and neoclassical economics focus. These transactions are marked by an imbalance between sellers and buyers. The underlying concern is that imperfectly informed and imperfectly rational consumers might fail to fully comprehend the costs and benefits of the product or service that they are purchasing. Moreover, sophisticated sellers can be expected to design their products, prices, and contracts in response to consumer misperception. Indeed, the design of consumer transactions can best be viewed as the outcome of an interaction between market forces and the psychology of consumers. The resulting behavioral market failure hurts consumers and reduces efficiency. Legal responses range from hard paternalistic policies to soft paternalistic policies, focusing on disclosure, default rules and safe harbors, and the right to withdraw from the transaction.
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Love Your Frequent-Flyer Program? Let It Go (Bloomberg View, June 13, 2014).
Categories:
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Consumer Protection Law
Type: Other
Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction By Contract: A Response to Critics, 9 Jerusalem Rev. Legal Stud. 95 (2013).
Categories:
Government & Politics
,
Banking & Finance
,
Consumer Finance
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Consumer Protection Law
,
Consumer Contracts
,
Law & Economics
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Administrative Law & Agencies
Type: Article
Abstract
I feel privileged that scholars of the caliber of Epstein, Becher and Zarsky and Teichman have engaged so deeply with my book, ♦Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics and Psychology in Consumer Markets♦ (hereinafter “♦Seduction♦”). I agree with many of their comments and observations. In this brief Response, I will attempt to clarify some of the arguments made in ♦Seduction♦ and explain why these arguments are consistent with many of the comments made by my four esteemed colleagues. Still, several important points of contention remain, and those too will be addressed in this Response.
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Exit from Contract, 6 J. Legal Analysis 151 (2014).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Consumer Finance
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Commercial Law
,
Consumer Protection Law
,
Consumer Contracts
,
Law & Economics
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Administrative Law & Agencies
Type: Article
Abstract
Exit from contract is one of the most powerful consumer protection devices, freeing consumers from bad deals and keeping businesses honest. Yet consumers often choose transactions with lock-in provisions, trading off exit rights for other perks. This article examines the costs and benefits of free exit, as compared to the lock-in alternative. It argues that present regulation of exit penalties is poorly tailored to address concerns about lock-in, particularly in light of increasingly ubiquitous market-based solutions. The article also calls (regulatory) attention to loyalty rewards, which are shown to be as powerful as exit penalties, and equally detrimental.
Oren Bar-Gill & Ariel Porat, Harm-Benefit Interactions, 16 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 86 (2014).
Categories:
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Property Law
Sub-Categories:
Remedies
,
Torts - Negligence
,
Torts
,
Private Law
,
Property Rights
Type: Article
Abstract
We analyze a distinct category of cases—Harm–Benefit cases—in which harm to the victim is accompanied by benefit to the injurer. While liability should be imposed when the benefit exceeds the harm, the case for liability becomes weaker when the harm is larger than the benefit. Therefore, it is often more important to impose liability on the non-negligent injurer than on the negligent injurer. We study the incentive effects of different liability rules, as well as the restitution rule. Our analysis also sheds new light on the law of takings. And it applies in certain contractual settings.
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law, 50 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 109 (2013).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Banking & Finance
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Consumer Protection Law
,
Consumer Contracts
,
European Law
Type: Article
Abstract
This Article classifies the consumer protection techniques that European contract law employs into four categories: Mandatory arrangements; disclosure; regulation of entry to and exit from contract; and pro-buyer default rules and contract interpretation. It argues that these techniques are far less likely to succeed than advocates, including the European Commission, believe, and they may bring about unintended consequences and hurt consumers. The techniques and their limits are illustrated through a study of proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL). The Article argues that the ambitious pursuit of consumer protection goals is also likely to interfere with the other main goal of the European contract law: harmonizing the laws of member states, encouraging cross border trade, and improving consumer' access to markets.
Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Pricing Misperceptions: Explaining Pricing Structure in the Cell Phone Service Market, 9 J. Empirical L. Stud. 430 (2012).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Consumer Finance
,
Technology & Law
Sub-Categories:
Commercial Law
,
Consumer Protection Law
,
Consumer Contracts
,
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Networked Society
Type: Article
Abstract
The cell phone service market is an economically significant market that has substantially increased consumer welfare. In this article, we focus on the pricing of cell phone service. The common pricing structure is a three-part tariff comprising: (1) a monthly charge; (2) a fixed number of minutes that the monthly charge pays for; and (3) a per-minute price for minutes beyond the plan limit. Using a unique data set of consumer-level monthly billing and usage information for 3,730 consumers at a single wireless provider, we evaluate the explanatory power of three accounts of the three-part tariff: a rational choice account; a behavioral account proposed by Grubb (2009) that supposes that consumers are overconfident in their estimates of their future usage; and a second behavioral account that posits that some consumers overestimate their average future usage while others underestimate it. We quantify the mistakes that consumers make in plan choice and, extrapolating from our data, estimate that these mistakes cost U.S. consumers over $13 billion annually. Our analysis suggests that regulation mandating the disclosure of product use information can be socially desirable in the cell phone service market.
Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1609 (2012).
Categories:
Criminal Law & Procedure
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Constitutional Law
Sub-Categories:
Fourth Amendment
,
Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement
,
Law & Economics
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
Type: Article
Abstract
Courts and commentators are increasingly concerned about police misconduct — searches and seizures that fail to comply with Fourth Amendment protections. Current doctrine attempts to deter such misconduct with the threat of excluding unlawfully seized evidence. The remedy of exclusion is weak, however, in large part because judges only see cases in which the defendant obviously is guilty. Despite years of proposals, the alternative of money damages is largely unavailable. The problem is exacerbated because Fourth Amendment law is notoriously uncertain. The combination of these three factors results in ineffective deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations. We propose to replace the failed deterrence model with a stringent ex ante warrant requirement. We make a novel case for warrants based on findings from the social sciences. The Court, rather than continuously weakening the warrant requirement, should reverse course and set warrants as the centerpiece of the Fourth Amendment.
Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Do We Understand the Documents We Sign? (OUPBlog, Aug. 1, 2012).
Categories:
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Consumer Contracts
Type: Other
Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act and Beyond, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 967 (2012).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Commercial Law
,
Consumer Protection Law
Type: Article
Abstract
We take a fresh look at the concerns about credit card pricing and empirically investigate whether the Credit CARD Act of 2009 (the CARD Act) has been successful in addressing those concerns. The rational choice theory of credit card pricing, which posits that issuers use back-end fees to adjust the price of credit to reflect new information about borrowers’ credit risk, predicts that issuers will respond to the CARD Act by using alternative ways to price risk. In contrast, the behavioral economics theory, which posits that issuers use back-end fees because they are not salient to consumers, predicts that issuers will respond by increasing unregulated nonsalient prices. If the market is competitive, we argue that the CARD Act should also result in increases in some salient, up-front prices. But we show that if issuers have market power, reductions in nonsalient fees may not result in concomitant increases in salient charges. We test these predictions using two datasets on credit card contract terms before and after the CARD Act rules went into effect. We find that the rules have substantially reduced the back-end fees directly regulated by the CARD Act, including late fees and over-the-limit fees. However, unregulated contract terms, such as annual fees and purchase interest rates, have changed little. Post–CARD Act, consumers continue to face high long-term prices and low short-term prices, and imperfectly rational consumers still have difficulty understanding the cost of credit card borrowing. We thus consider potential improvements to the regulatory framework. We argue that improved disclosures that provide consumers with the aggregate cost of credit under the contract, based on information about the borrower’s likely use of credit, would improve consumer outcomes. Furthermore, we suggest that regulators should not focus only on prices that are “too high” but should also consider limiting the ability of issuers to charge introductory teaser interest rates that are, in a sense, “too low.”
Oren Bar-Gill, Competition and Consumer Protection: A Behavioral Economics Account, in The Pros and Cons of Consumer Protection 12 (Swedish Competition Authority 2012).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Consumer Protection Law
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
Type: Book
Oren Bar-Gill & Shmuel Becher, Consumer Protection, in The Economic Approach to Law 223 (Uriel Procaccia ed., Nevo Pub. 2012).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Economics
,
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Consumer Protection Law
Type: Book
Oren Bar-Gill & Oliver Board, Product Use Information and the Limits of Voluntary Disclosure, 14 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 235 (2012).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Consumer Finance
,
Government & Politics
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Commercial Law
,
Consumer Protection Law
,
Law & Economics
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Administrative Law & Agencies
Type: Article
Abstract
Concern about asymmetric information in markets for consumer goods and services has focused on product-attribute information. We highlight the importance of another category of information--product-use information. In important markets, sellers have better information about how a consumer will use their product or service than the consumer herself. Moreover, we show that the classic unraveling results do not extend to product-use information, and thus sellers are less likely to voluntarily disclose this type of information. Our findings have important policy implications: While most disclosure mandates target product-attribute information, our analysis suggests that mandating disclosure of product-use information may be more important. Indeed, policy makers are beginning to recognize the importance of product-use disclosures.
Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2010).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Consumer Protection Law
Type: Article
Abstract
Consumer contracts are pervasive. Yet, the promises that make up these contracts are becoming increasingly empty, as sellers reserve the power to modify their contracts unilaterally. While some modifications benefit both sellers and consumers, others increase seller profits at the consumer’s expense. The law’s goal should be to facilitate good modifications, while preventing bad ones. Currently this goal is not met. The problem is twofold. First, consumers fail to appreciate the risk of unilateral modification and thus fail to demand a commitment by sellers to avoid inefficient modifications. Second, and more important, even if consumers demand a commitment to make only mutually beneficial modifications, existing commitment mechanisms—consumer assent to modifications, judicial review of modifications, and seller reputation—are inadequate. We propose a novel commitment mechanism: adding Change Approval Boards (“CABs”) as parties to consumer contracts. These CABs would selectively assent to, or withhold assent from, contractual changes that sellers wish to make, according to each CAB’s modification policy. We envision a market for CABs—multiple CABs, each striking a different balance between flexibility and security, offering a range of modification policies from which consumers can choose. The market-based CAB system promises to deter abusive term changes while retaining the flexibility to change consumer contracts when change is justified.
Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, Informing Consumers About Themselves, Symposium: Defining and Balancing 'Autonomy v. Paternalism', 3 Erasmus L. Rev. 93 (2010).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Government & Politics
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Consumer Protection Law
,
Administrative Law & Agencies
Type: Article
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners' (Plea Bargain) Dilemma, 1 J. of Legal Analysis 737 (2009).
Categories:
Criminal Law & Procedure
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Criminal Prosecution
,
Criminal Defense
,
Sentencing & Punishment
,
Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement
,
Law & Economics
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
Type: Article
Abstract
How can a prosecutor, who has only limited resources, credibly threaten so many defendants with costly and risky trials and extract plea bargains involving harsh sentences? Had defendants refused to settle, many of them would not have been charged or would have escaped with lenient sanctions. But such collective stonewalling requires coordination among defendants, which is difficult if not impossible to attain. Moreover, the prosecutor, by strategically timing and targeting her plea offers, can create conflicts of interest among defendants, frustrating any attempt at coordination. The substantial bargaining power of the resource-constrained prosecutor is therefore the product of the collective action problem that plagues defendants. This conclusion suggests that, despite the common view to the contrary, the institution of plea bargains may not improve the well-being of defendants. Absent the plea bargain option, many defendants would not have been charged in the first place. Thus, we can no longer count on the fact that plea bargains are entered voluntarily to argue that they are desirable for all parties involved.
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain) Dilemma, 33 Reg., Winter 2010, at 42.
Categories:
Criminal Law & Procedure
Sub-Categories:
Criminal Defense
Type: Article
Abstract
This article is based on the authors’ paper, “The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain) Dilemma, Journal of Legal Analysis (2009).
Oren Bar-Gill, Argument for a Consumer Finance Protection Agency is Strong, Despite Criticism (The Hill, Nov. 18, 2009, 11:55 PM).
Categories:
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Consumer Protection Law
Type: Other
Abstract
The CFPA has been the target of much criticism — criticism that aims to derail the CFPA proposal. Congress must see through this criticism. While the critics are making some valid points, their most powerful arguments have nothing to do with the basic question: Do we need a CFPA? The (almost) uncontested answer to this question is: “Yes, we do.”
Oren Bar-Gill, The Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Sorting the Critiques, Lombard Street, Sept. 14, 2009, at 4.
Categories:
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Consumer Protection Law
Type: Other
Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1073 (2009).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Financial Reform
,
Investment Products
,
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Consumer Protection Law
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Law & Economics
Type: Article
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, An Information Theory of Willful Breach, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1479 (2009).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
Type: Article
Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1649 (2009).
Categories:
Technology & Law
Sub-Categories:
Science & Technology
,
Intellectual Property Law
Type: Article
Oren Bar-Gill, Flexible, Responsible Credit-Card Reform (Bloomberg, May 2009, 5:32 PM).
Categories:
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Consumer Protection Law
Type: Other
Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Mobile Misperceptions, 23 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 49 (2009).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Consumer Finance
,
Technology & Law
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Consumer Protection Law
,
Consumer Contracts
,
Communications Law
,
Science & Technology
Type: Article
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Threatening an ‘Irrational’ Breach of Contract, in Recent Developments in Law and Economics (Robert D. Cooter & Francesco Parisi eds., 2009).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Consumer Contracts
,
Consumer Protection Law
Type: Book
Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2008).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Consumer Finance
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Government & Politics
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Financial Reform
,
Banking
,
Contracts
,
Consumer Protection Law
,
Consumer Bankruptcy Law
,
Consumer Contracts
,
Law & Public Policy
,
Poverty Law
,
Law & Economics
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Administrative Law & Agencies
Type: Article
Abstract
Physical products, from toasters and lawnmowers, to infant car seats and toys, to meat and drugs, are routinely inspected and regulated for safety. Credit products, like mortgage loans and credit cards, on the other hand, are left largely unregulated, even though they can also be unsafe. Because financial products are analyzed through a contract paradigm rather than a products paradigm, consumers have been left with unsafe credit products. These dangerous products can lead to financial distress, bankruptcy, and foreclosure, and, as evidenced by the recent subprime crisis, they can have devastating effects on communities and on the economy. In this Article, we use the physical products analogy to build a case, supported by both theory and data, for comprehensive safety regulation of consumer credit. We then examine the present state of consumer credit regulation, explaining why the current regulatory regime has systematically failed to provide meaningful safety regulations. We propose a fundamental restructuring of this regime, urging the creation of a new federal regulator that will have both the authority and the incentives to police the safety of consumer credit products.
Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 749 (2008).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Consumer Protection Law
,
Consumer Contracts
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
Type: Article
Oren Bar-Gill, The Evolution and Persistence of Optimism in Litigation, 22 J.L. Econ. & Org. 490 (2006).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
Sub-Categories:
Remedies
,
Litigation & Settlement
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Law & Economics
Type: Article
Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal-Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L. & Econ. 353 (2006).
Categories:
Criminal Law & Procedure
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Criminal Prosecution
,
Sentencing & Punishment
,
Criminal Defense
,
Courts
Type: Article
Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misconception, Symposium: Homo Economicus, Homo Myopicus, and the Law and Economics of Consumer Choice, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 33 (2006).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Consumer Finance
,
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Commercial Law
,
Consumer Protection Law
,
Antitrust & Competition Law
Type: Article
Abstract
This Essay studies bundling of two (or more) products as a strategic response to consumer misperception. In contrast to the bundling and tying studied in the antitrust literature—strategies used by a seller with market power in market A trying to leverage its market power into market B — bundling in response to consumer misperception may occur in intensely competitive markets. The analysis demonstrates that such competitive bundling can be either welfare enhancing or welfare reducing. The Essay considers several “unbundling policies” that can protect consumers and increase welfare in markets where bundling is undesirable.
Oren Bar-Gill, Quantifying Foreseeability, Symposium: Default Rules in Private and Public Law, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 619 (2006).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Economics
,
Law & Economics
Type: Article
Abstract
This Article extends the law-and-economics literature on the foreseeability doctrine and on contract default rules more generally. It derives (numerically) the optimal default cap on contractual damages in a model with a continuum of buyer types and perfect competition among sellers. When communication costs are low, the optimal cap is significantly higher than the damages incurred by the average buyer. A better performance technology reduces the optimal damages cap. Greater homogeneity among buyers increases the optimal cap. The Ar- ticle identifies conditions under which an optimally defined foresee- ability threshold significantly increases welfare. It also explores the normative implications of the doctrinal preclusion of a zero-damages default.
Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Marketplace for Ideas?, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 395 (2005).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Technology & Law
,
Property Law
Sub-Categories:
Economics
,
Intellectual Property - Patent & Trademark
,
Intellectual Property Law
,
Information Commons
Type: Article
Abstract
Traditionally, patent protection extended only to full-fledged inventions. In recent years, however, the legal landscape has changed. Patent law is gradually extending its reach to cover "embryonic inventions," and even naked ideas. This Essay has two goals. The first is to present an economic case against extending property rights to embryonic inventions and ideas. Specifically, this Essay argues that property rights in ideas will hinder technological progress. This Essay's second goal is to propose an alternative legal regime that would enhance innovation. To this end, this Essay contemplates the possibility of formalizing a very limited and narrow legal entitlement in ideas in order to establish a marketplace where ideas may be exchanged. After rejecting existing models of property and intellectual property protection as the foundation for a market for ideas, we propose an original market design that could enhance innovation without impoverishing the public domain.
Oren Bar-Gill, Pricing Legal Options: A Behavioral Perspective, 1 Rev. L. & Econ. 203 (2005).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Banking & Finance
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Corporate Law & Securities
Sub-Categories:
Economics
,
Contracts
,
Corporate Law
,
Torts
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Law & Economics
Type: Article
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 717 (2005).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Criminal Law & Procedure
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Consumer Protection Law
,
Consumer Bankruptcy Law
,
Criminal Prosecution
Type: Article
Abstract
The ideal of individual liberty and autonomy requires that society provide relief against coercion. In the law, this requirement is often translated into rules that operate "post-coercion" to undo the legal consequences of acts and promises extracted under duress. This Article argues that these ex-post anti-duress measures, rather than helping the coerced party, might in fact hurt her. When coercion is crediblewhen a credible threat to inflict an even worse outcome underlies the surrender of the coerced partyex post relief will only induce the strong party to execute the threatened outcome, to the detriment of the coerced party. Anti-duress relief can be helpful to the coerced party only when the threat that led to her surrender was not credible, or when the making of threats can be deterred in the first place. The credibility methodology developed in this Article, descriptive in nature, is shown to be a prerequisite (or an important complement) to any normative theory of coercion. The Article explores the implications of credible coercion analysis for existing philosophical conceptions of coercion, and applies its lessons in different legal contexts, ranging from contractual duress and unconscionability to plea bargains and bankruptcy.
Oren Bar-Gill & Chaim Fershtman, Public Policy with Endogenous Preferences, 7 J. Pub. Econ. Theory 841 (2005).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Economics
,
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Law & Public Policy
Type: Article
Abstract
Public policy may influence norms and preferences. By altering the payoffs associated with different preferences, public policy may influence the distribution of these preferences in the population. Such interdependence between policy and preferences may limit (or enhance) the effectiveness of different policies. We demonstrate this idea with a simple model of subsidizing contributions to a public good. While the short-run effect of such a subsidy will be an increase in the overall contribution, the subsidy triggers an endogenous preference change that results in a lower level of contribution to the public good, despite the explicit monetary incentives to raise that level. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Inc..
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Threatening an 'Irrational' Breach of Contract, in The Law and Economics of Irrational Behavior (Francesco Parisi & Vernon Smith eds., 2005).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Consumer Contracts
,
Consumer Protection Law
Type: Book
Abstract
This collection of essays explores the most relevant developments at the interface of economics and psychology, giving special attention to models of irrational behavior, and draws the relevant implications of such models for the design of ...
Oren Bar-Gill & Chaim Fershtman, Law and Preferences, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 331 (2004).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Law & Economics
Type: Article
Abstract
Legal rules do more than provide incentives, they change people. When preferences and norms are endogenously determined via a process of imitation and learning, legal rules, by affecting the market outcome, may affect the dynamics of preference formation. Analyzing the effect of different legal rules should therefore go beyond the analysis of the incentives they provide. It should also include an analysis of their effect on the distribution of preferences and norms of behavior. We illustrate this claim by considering a simple market game in which individuals may have preferences that include fairness concerns. We show that different legal rules change not only the pattern of trade in a market game, but also individuals’ fairness concerns. That is, different rules may eventually make individuals care more (or less) about a fair outcome. Specifically, our model suggests that enhanced remedies for breach of contract may reduce equilibrium preferences for fairness.
Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Intellectual Property Law and the Boundaries of the Firm (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 18, June 24, 2004).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Property Law
,
Technology & Law
Sub-Categories:
Business Organizations
,
Intellectual Property - Patent & Trademark
,
Intellectual Property Law
Type: Article
Abstract
Arrow's disclosure paradox implies that information that is not afforded legal protection cannot be bought or sold on the market. This paper emphasizes the important relationship between the paradox of disclosure and the boundaries of the firm question. Only legally protected inventions, i.e., patented inventions, may be traded; pre-patent stages of the innovation process may not. Consequently, by force of law, rather than by the guidance of economic principle, pre-patent innovation must be carried out within the boundaries of a single firm.
Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1373 (2004).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Consumer Protection Law
,
Consumer Contracts
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
Type: Article
Abstract
In consumer contracts highly sophisticated corporations will often exploit consumers’ behavioral biases. Competition cannot cure such exploitation. On the contrary, competitive forces compel sellers to take advantage of consumers’ weaknesses. This general theme is demonstrated through a detailed case study of the credit card market. In designing the credit card contract, issuers deviate from efficient marginal-cost pricing in order to take advantage of consumers’ underestimation of their future borrowing. This prevalent bias explains several unique features of the credit card contract, including high interest rates, zero annual and per transaction fees, teaser rates, high late and over-limit fees, benefits programs, and low (and even negative) amortization rates. The identified market failure suggests that legal intervention may be required to protect consumers and to increase social welfare. Several specific policy responses areconsidered, including disclosure, regulation of unsolicited offers,unbundling of transacting and borrowing services, and usury ceilings. The role of contract law and bankruptcy law is also examined. More broadly, the credit card case study demonstrates that pricing patterns can be used as indicators of a behavioral market failure, signaling a potential role for legal intervention.
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Threatening an "Irrational" Breach of Contract, 11 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 143 (2004).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
Type: Article
Oren Bar-Gill & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Liability for Libel, 2 B.E. J. Econ. Analysis & Pol'y 1 (2003).
Categories:
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Constitutional Law
Sub-Categories:
First Amendment
,
Torts
Type: Article
Abstract
Although courts justify the constitutional law of libel with consequential reasoning, the true consequences of liability for harmful speech have never been fully explored. We construct an analytical framework for studying libel law, emphasizing both the positive and negative externalities generated by the publication of information. Our model highlights two distinct decisions that a publisher faces, the verification decision and the publication decision. We first demonstrate that a single damage measure for publication of false libelous information, such as the “damages equal harm” measure, cannot simultaneously induce socially optimal decisions regarding verification and publication. We then argue that the damage measure should depend on the efficacy of the verification process. Interestingly, when verification is reasonably effective, the damage award should be set equal to the social benefit from truthful publication. Our analysis provides a theoretical foundation for important elements of current libel law. It also suggests practicable avenues for reform.
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence, 5 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 433 (2003).
Categories:
Civil Practice & Procedure
Sub-Categories:
Torts
,
Torts - Negligence
Type: Article
Abstract
This article questions, and in some contexts disproves, the validity of the efficiency justifications for the comparative negligence rule. One argument in the literature suggests that comparative negligence is the superior rule in the presence of court errors. The analysis here shows the analytical flaw in this claim and conducts numerical simulations -- a form of synthetic "empirical" tests -- that prove the potential superiority of other rules. The second argument in the literature in favor of the comparative negligence rule is based on its alleged superior ability to deal with private information. This article develops a general approach to liability rules as mechanisms that induce self-selection among actors. It then shows that self-selection can occur, not only under comparative negligence, but also under every other negligence rule. These conclusions weaken the efficiency explanation for the growing appeal of the "division-of-liability" principle within tort law and beyond. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1857 (2003).
Categories:
Technology & Law
,
Property Law
Sub-Categories:
Intellectual Property - Patent & Trademark
,
Intellectual Property Law
,
Information Commons
Type: Article
Abstract
This Essay demonstrates the strategic advantage of narrow patents and unprotected publication of R&D output. Broad patents might stifle follow-on improvements by deterring potential cumulative innovators, who fear being held up by the initial inventor at the ex post licensing stage. By opting for a narrower patent and unprotected publication, the initial patent holder commits not to hold up follow-on inventors, thus promoting sequential innovation and generating lucrative licensing fees. Counterintuitively, in cumulative innovation settings, less protection benefits the patentee. This finding may serve as a counter-force to the much-lamented "anti-commons" problem. More generally, our theory demonstrates that the divergence between private interests and social objectives - on both the static and dynamic dimensions of intellectual property - is not as great as conventionally believed. Our theory bridges yet another gap; that between the two main theoretic strands in patent law scholarship - the property rights perspective and the information revelation perspective. It also explains the recent trend toward unprotected publication of information. Finally, we propose an important reform of the novelty requirement in patent law that would further encourage narrow patents and unprotected publication by bolstering the credibility of a patentees commitment not to patent previously published research findings.
Oren Bar-Gill & Alon Harel, Crime Rates and Expected Sanctions: The Economics of Deterrence Revisited, 30 J. Legal Stud. 485 (2001).
Categories:
Criminal Law & Procedure
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Sentencing & Punishment
,
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Law & Economics
Type: Article
Oren Bar-Gill, The Success and Survival of Cautious Optimism: Legal Rules and Endogenous Perceptions in Pre-Trial Settlement Negotiations (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 375, 2002).
Categories:
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Dispute Resolution
,
Litigation & Settlement
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
Type: Article
Abstract
Litigants are unrealistically optimistic with regard to the probability of prevailing at trial. This systematic bias is well documented, and has been often invoked to explain breakdowns in pre-trial settlement negotiations. Contrary to existing models that allow for optimism as an exogenous assumption, the present study derives this cognitive bias endogenously. It thus provides a theoretical foundation for optimism in litigation. Quasi-evolutionary forces - market pressure (in the market for legal services) and imitation processes - are shown to favor cautiously optimistic litigants. Moreover, the endogenous optimism model enables an examination of the factors that determine the magnitude of the optimism bias. In particular, it is shown that the legal environment influences the equilibrium level of optimism. Focusing on rules for the allocation of litigation costs, the American rule induces a higher level of optimism, as compared to the British rule. This finding qualifies the conventional wisdom regarding the advantage of the American rule in fostering settlements. Finally, the present analysis is offered as an illustration of a broader theme, that the law can play an important role in determining the types and magnitudes of prevailing cognitive biases. The identification, characterization and analysis of this perception-shaping role of legal institutions are a novelty of the present study. Behavioral law and economics is revealed as a two-way, rather than a one-way street. Not only do cognitive biases affect the operation of legal rules, but also the legal rules themselves influence the types and magnitudes of observed biases.

Academic Appointment and Employment History

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Griswold 310

617-495-4623

Assistant: Patricia Fazzone / 617-496-2075