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Publication Types
Categories
Hal S. Scott, Connectedness and Contagion: Protecting the Financial System from Panics (MIT Press 2016).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Government & Politics
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Financial Reform
,
Fiduciary Law
,
Banking
,
Congress & Legislation
,
Administrative Law & Agencies
,
Comparative Law
Type: Book
Abstract
The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 was intended to reform financial policies in order to prevent another massive crisis such as the financial meltdown of 2008. Dodd–Frank is largely premised on the diagnosis that connectedness was the major problem in that crisis—that is, that financial institutions were overexposed to one another, resulting in a possible chain reaction of failures. In this book, Hal Scott argues that it is not connectedness but contagion that is the most significant element of systemic risk facing the financial system. Contagion is an indiscriminate run by short-term creditors of financial institutions that can render otherwise solvent institutions insolvent. It poses a serious risk because, as Scott explains, our financial system still depends on approximately $7.4 to $8.2 trillion of runnable and uninsured short-term liabilities, 60 percent of which are held by nonbanks. Scott argues that efforts by the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the Treasury to stop the contagion that exploded after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers lessened the economic damage. And yet Congress, spurred by the public’s aversion to bailouts, has dramatically weakened the power of the government to respond to contagion, including limitations on the Fed’s powers as a lender of last resort. Offering uniquely detailed forensic analyses of the Lehman Brothers and AIG failures, and suggesting alternative regulatory approaches, Scott makes the case that we need to restore and strengthen our weapons for fighting contagion.
Hal S. Scott & Anna Gelpern, International Finance: Transactions, Policy and Regulation (Found. Press 21st ed. 2016).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Finance
,
Financial Reform
,
Securities Law & Regulation
,
Corporate Law
,
International Monetary Systems
Type: Book
Capital Adequacy beyond Basel: Banking, Securities, and Insurance (Hal S. Scott ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2005).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Banking
,
Finance
,
Insurance Law
,
Securities Law & Regulation
Type: Book
Abstract
This book is timely since the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the Bank for International Settlements is in the process of making major changes in the capital rules for banks. It is important that capital adequacy regulation helps to achieve financial stability in the most efficient way. Capital adequacy rules have become a key tool to protect financial institutions. The research contained within the book covers some key issues at stake in the capital requirements for insurance and securities firms. The contributors are among the leading scholars in financial economics and law. Their contributions analyze the use of subordinated debt, internal models, and rating agencies in addition to examining the effect on capital of reinsurance, securitization, credit derivatives, and similar instruments. Available in OSO: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/economicsfinance/0195169719/toc.html
Hal S. Scott, To Grow, First Free the Banks, N.Y. Times, May 15, 2017, at A19.
Categories:
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Banking
,
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Financial Reform
Type: News
Charles W. Calomiris, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, R. Glenn Hubbard, Allan H. Meltzer & Hal S. Scott, Establishing Credible Rules for Fed Emergency Lending, J. Fin. Econ. Pol’y (forthcoming 2017).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Financial Reform
Type: Article
Abstract
The current framework governing emergency lending – including reforms to Federal Reserve lending enacted after the recent crisis – are inadequate and not credible. We propose reforms that would establish a credible framework of rules to constrain and guide emergency lending by the Federal Reserve and by fiscal authorities during a future financial crisis. Our proposed framework follows five overarching rules, informed by history, empirical evidence and theory, which would serve as the foundation on which detailed legislation should be constructed. Adequate assistance to financial institutions would be provided in systemic crises but would be limited in its form, and by the process that would govern its provision. Our framework would serve as a basis for establishing effective rules that would be credible, and that would properly balance the moral-hazard costs of emergency lending against the gains from avoiding systemic collapse of the financial system.
Hal S. Scott & Brian A. Johnson, Controlling the Long-Term Problems of Short-Term Funding (Feb. 2017).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Financial Reform
Type: Other
Abstract
While financial crises can be triggered by a number of causes, runs on short-term liabilities are at the heart of all financial crises with the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis being no exception. Given the unpredictability of crisis triggers and the overwhelming predictability of short-term funding’s role in financial crises, legislative and regulatory responses to the recent financial crisis should focus on controlling the problem of short-term funding in the financial system. However, in addressing the problem of short-term funding in the financial system, it is important to recognize the social benefits afforded by short-term liabilities and not simply the costs. To this end, this Article provides a brief overview of short-term funding in the U.S. financial system, while also highlighting the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of short-term liabilities. The Article proceeds with an analysis of various proposals aimed at addressing the short-term funding issue.
Hal S. Scott, Kristin Ricci & Aaron Sarfatti, SRISK as a Measure of Systemic Risk for Insurers: Oversimplified and Inappropriate (Harvard Law Sch., Sept. 12, 2016).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Finance
,
Economics
Type: Article
Abstract
The SRISK measure has been used to measure the relative systemic risk for financial institutions, ranking some insurers as vulnerable as banks to large capital shortfalls in stressed macroeconomic environments. This paper argues that the assumptions underpinning the SRISK measure are inappropriate for insurers and hence do not depict an accurate representation of insurer systemic risk.
Hal S. Scott, The Federal Reserve: The Weakest Lender of Last Resort Among its Peers, 18 Int’l Fin. 321 (2015).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Finance
,
International Monetary Systems
Type: Article
Abstract
This article for the first time compares the Federal Reserve's powers as lender of last resort (LLR') and its ability to fight contagion, with its three major peers, the Bank of England (the BOE'), the European Central Bank (the ECB') and the Bank of Japan (the BOJ'). It concludes that the Federal Reserve (the Fed') is currently the weakest of the four, largely due to a hostile political environment for LLR powers, which are equated with bailouts, and restrictions placed by the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act on the Fed's ability to loan to non-banks, whose role in the financial system is ever-increasing. This is a concern for the global as well as the US financial system, given the economic importance of the United States and the use of the dollar as a reserve currency.
John C. Coates, IV, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & Mark J. Roe (with Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Henry Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson, Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian J.M. Quinn, Edward B. Rock & Helen S. Scott, Supreme Court Amicus Brief of 19 Corporate Law Professors, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, No. 14-915 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2015).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Constitutional Law
Sub-Categories:
First Amendment
,
Corporate Law
,
Shareholders
Type: Article
Abstract
The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt out” rights or practical ability to avoid subsidizing corporate political expression with which they disagree. Nor do individuals have the practical option to refrain from putting their savings into equity investments, as doing so would impose damaging economic penalties and ignore conventional financial guidance for individual investors.
Mark Ames, Til Schuermann & Hal S. Scott, Bank Capital For Operational Risk: A tale of fragility and instability, 8 J. Risk Mgmt. Fin. Inst. 227 (2015).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Banking
,
Financial Reform
,
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Risk Regulation
Type: Article
Abstract
Operational risk is fundamentally different from all other risks taken on by a bank. It is embedded in every activity and product of an institution, and in contrast to the conventional financial risks (eg market, credit) is harder to measure and model, and not straightforwardly eliminated through simple adjustments like selling off a position. While it varies considerably, operational risk tends to represent about 10–30 per cent of the total risk pie, and has grown rapidly since the 2008–2009 crisis. It tends to be more fat-tailed than other risks, and the data are poorer. As a result, models are fragile — small changes in the data have dramatic impacts on modelled output — and thus required operational risk capital is unstable. Yet the US regulatory capital regime, the central focus of this paper, is surprisingly more rigidly model-focused for this risk than for any other. The authors are especially concerned with the absence of incentives to invest in and improve business control processes through the granting of regulatory capital relief, and make three, not mutually exclusive, policy suggestions. First, address model fragility directly through regulatory anchoring of key model parameters, yet allow each bank to scale capital to their data using robust methodologies. Secondly, relax the current tight linkage between statistical model output and required regulatory capital, incentivising prudent risk management through joint use of scenarios and control factors in addition to data-based statistical models in setting regulatory capital. Thirdly, provide allowance for real risk transfer through an insurance credit to capital, encouraging more effective risk sharing through future product innovation. Until the understanding of operational risks increases, required regulatory capital should be based on methodologies that are simpler, more standardised, more stable and more robust.
Hal S. Scott, The Importance of the Retail Payment System (MasterCard, Dec. 16, 2014).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Economics
,
Finance
Type: Article
Abstract
This article explores the importance of an efficient retail payment system and develops an integrated framework for evaluation of the retail payment system by policy makers. It examines the costs and benefits of the various types of retail payment system, focusing on the seven desirable benefits of the retail payment system: (1) finality and reversibility; (2) universality (ability to use at point of sale and remotely); (3) recordkeeping; (4) liquidity (maximizing interest earning assets); (5) security and safety; (6) financial inclusion and access; and (7) fungibility and ease of use (seven benefits). The article discusses the Coase Theorem, a proposition from transaction cost economics that provides a useful tool for analyzing transaction efficiency. Increased costs are not bad per se since parties are often willing to incur higher costs to achieve their desired results, e.g. higher costs for a more secure form of payment. Indeed, higher costs may often generate higher value to both parties to a transaction. What one wants to reduce are “friction” costs, costs that neither party wants to pay to achieve a desired result, e.g. higher costs produced by lack of information. While each retail payment system provides certain advantages, e.g. cash for small transactions, overall the analysis suggests that debit and credit cards represent the most desirable payment system for achieving the seven benefits set forth above. This is supported by statistics that indicate that retail payments have increasingly moved toward card payments.
Hal S. Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory Individual Arbitration for Stockholder Disputes, 36 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1188 (2013).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Shareholders
,
Corporate Law
,
Arbitration
,
Dispute Resolution
,
Empirical Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)1 together govern securities class actions. These regimes provide that a class representative may bring a claim against a corporation on behalf of all investors who owned a security at a time when there was an alleged misstatement or failure to disclose a material fact that caused loss. By default all potential members of a class—all investors who owned the security during the relevant time (before the misstatement or omission was corrected)—are included in the class unless they take the affirmative step of opting out. Inertia, therefore, works to expand the class.
Hal S. Scott, Interconnectedness and Contagion (Comm. on Capital Mkt. Reg., Nov. 20, 2012).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Corporate Law & Securities
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Finance
,
Financial Reform
,
Securities Law & Regulation
,
Corporate Law
Type: Other
Abstract
This study engages in a detailed analysis of interconnectedness (i.e., the linkage between financial institutions) in the context of the failure of Lehman Brothers in October 2008 and concludes that interconnectedness was not a major cause of the recent financial crisis. The study continues with a discussion of financial contagion (i.e., run-like behavior that spreads from the perceived failure of a financial institution to other financial institutions) and an analysis of possible solutions to contagion. The study highlights that a distinguishing feature of contagion is its ability to spread indiscriminately among firms in the financial sector and notes that contagious runs can occur even if there are no direct linkages to the original institution (i.e., even in the absence of interconnectedness). The study comes to the conclusion that contagion was the primary cause of the financial crisis and that short-term funding in particular is the primary source of systemic instability. In the context of these conclusions, the study engages in a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the possible solutions to financial contagion. The solutions include: (i) capital requirements, (ii) liquidity requirements, (iii) resolution procedures, (iv) money market mutual fund reform, (v) lender of last resort, (vi) liability insurance and guarantees, and (vii) public bailouts. Each potential solution is discussed in detail with an evaluation of its effectiveness in addressing financial contagion.
Hal S. Scott & Anna Gelpern, International Finance: Law and Regulation (3rd ed. 2012).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Banking
,
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
International Law
,
International Monetary Systems
,
European Law
Type: Book
Benjamin M. Friedman, George C. Kaufman, Robert C. Pozen & Hal S. Scott, Comments, in Reforming U.S. Financial Markets: Reflections Before and Beyond Dodd-Frank 85 (Benjamin M. Friedman ed., 2011).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Banking
,
Risk Regulation
,
Financial Markets & Institutions
Type: Book
Abstract
Papers and discussions presented at the fifth Alvin Hansen Symposium on Public Policy, held at Harvard University on April 30, 2009.
Hal S. Scott, The Competitive Impact of Financial Regulatory Reform, 26 J. Int'l Banking L. & Reg. 527 (2011).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Corporate Law & Securities
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Banking
,
Securities Law & Regulation
Type: Article
Abstract
Regulatory reforms in the wake of the global financial crisis have made some useful corrections to US and international financial markets. Unfortunately, some of the changes could weaken the competitiveness of US financial institutions. All regulatory proposals should be based on rigorous cost-benefit analysis, and competitive impact should be an important consideration. There are five areas where competitive impact could be particularly important: public support for financial firms; the designation and regulation of systemically important financial institutions; the Volcker Rule; regulations governing derivatives; and capital requirements. As a general matter, without much more international co-ordination, regulatory reforms risk creating significant competitive distortions.
Hal S. Scott, The Next Step in Global Financial Regulation: Global Regulation of Interconnectedness, 1 Global Pol'y 332 (2010)(response to Howard Davies, Global Financial Regulation after the Credit Crisis, 1 Global Pol'y 185 (2010)).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Finance
,
International Monetary Systems
Type: Article
Hal S. Scott, Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation, 13 J. Int. Econ. L. 763 (2010).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Financial Reform
,
Finance
,
Risk Regulation
Type: Article
Abstract
Capital requirements are a key element in containing systemic risk. This article argues that the market needs to play a more significant role in determining these requirements. The Basel process has a bad track record and there are inherent methodological and political difficulties in a group of regulators, particularly an international one, determining the appropriate amount of capital for a given risk. An added role for the market depends, however, on fuller disclosure by banks of their risks and minimization of the moral hazard created by bailouts, so creditors and counterparties bear a fuller measure of the risk.
Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the U.S. Financial System, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 672 (2010).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Financial Reform
,
Finance
,
Risk Regulation
Type: Article
Abstract
The central problem for financial regulation is reducing systemic risk. Systemic risk is the risk that the failure of one significant institution can cause or significantly contribute to the failure of other significant institutions. This paper addresses the five most important policies for dealing with systemic risk: the imposition of capital requirements, the use of clearinghouses and exchanges for over-the-counter derivatives, the resolution of insolvent institutions, emergency lending by the Federal Reserve and the structure of the regulatory system. The author also argues that the Volcker Rules and related limitations on bank size would not reduce systemic risk.
Hal S. Scott, A General Evaluation of the Dodd-Frank U.S. Financial Reform Legislation, 25 J. Int'l Banking L. & Reg. 477 (2010).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Banking
,
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Financial Reform
Type: Article
Hal S. Scott, An Optional Federal Charter for Insurance: Rationale and Design, in The Future of Insurance Regulation in the United States 55 (Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein eds., 2009).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
Sub-Categories:
Insurance Law
Type: Book
Hal S. Scott, The Global Financial Crisis (Foundation Press 2009).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Financial Reform
,
International Monetary Systems
Type: Book
Abstract
This timely book is an up-to-date view of the nature of the global financial crisis and the various statutory, regulatory and policy responses to it. As such, it focuses on recent developments and underlying policy issues. It looks closely at financial and economic aspects of the recent credit crisis as well as the purely legal dimensions. By its nature, it is cross-disciplinary. This book is a valuable tool for any law student looking to understand the legal and regulatory factors implicated in the global credit crisis.
Hal S. Scott, What to Do About Foreign Discriminatory Forum Non Conveniens Legislation, 49 Harv. Int'l L.J. Online 95 (2009).
Categories:
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Litigation & Settlement
,
Jurisdiction
,
Torts
,
Courts
,
Foreign Law
Type: Article
Hal S. Scott, Use of International Financial Reporting Standards by Foreign and US Issuers, 23 J. Int'l Banking L. & Reg. 238 (2008).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Corporate Law & Securities
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Securities Law & Regulation
Type: Article
Abstract
In November 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) took the historic decision to allow foreign issuers of securities in US public markets the option of stating their accounts using international financial reporting standards (IFRS), without reconciliation to US generally accepted accounting principles (US GAAP), for financial years ending after November 15, 2007. Such foreign issuers could also, as some have already done, continue to state their accounts in US GAAP. This naturally raised the issue as to whether US issuers should be given the same option, or even more radically, whether such issuers should be required, as of a date certain, to state their accounts in IFRS. My view is that US issuers need an option to permit operational cost savings and perhaps even achieve a lower cost of capital. But for now, the option should neither be perpetual nor conditioned upon a plan to require US issuers to use IFRS.
Hal S. Scott, International Finance: Rule Choices for Global Financial Markets, in Research Handbook of International Economic Law 361 (Andrew T. Guzman & Alan O. Sykes eds., Edward Elgar Pub. 2007).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
International Law
Type: Book
Hal S. Scott, What is the United States Doing About the Competitiveness of its Capital Markets?, 22 J. Int'l Banking L. & Reg. 487 (2007).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Corporate Law & Securities
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Investment Products
,
Securities Law & Regulation
Type: Article
Hal S. Scott, The Need for a New Look at Capital Markets Regulation Post-Enron, 21 J. Int'l Banking L. & Reg. 169 (2006).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Risk Regulation
,
Financial Reform
,
Corporate Governance
,
Securities Law & Regulation
Type: Article
Abstract
The Enron scandal and the scandals that followed it, together with losses incurred by investors from the burst of the dot.com bubble, triggered a revolution in the regulation of the US capital markets beginning in 2000. Over five years later, it is time to re-examine the revolution's effects.
Hal S. Scott, Market Discipline for Financial Institutions and Sovereigns, in Market Discipline Across Countries and Industries 69 (Claudio Borio, William C. Hunter, George G. Kaufman & Kostas Tsatsaronis eds., 2004).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Banking
,
Risk Regulation
,
International Monetary Systems
Type: Book
Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?, 37 Int'l Law. 103 (2003).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Banking
,
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Corporate Bankruptcy & Reorganization
,
International Law
,
International Monetary Systems
Type: Article
Abstract
This article explores whether a more formal bankruptcy procedure, the "Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism" (SDRM) as proposed by the IMF, or in some modified form, is needed to deal with sovereign debt problems. The key consequences of the invocation of such a procedure would be a standstill on creditors' collections of principal and interest, a stay on creditors' attachments or foreclosures on assets, and new money priority for any funds lent to a sovereign during the duration of the procedure. Negotiations would ensue between the sovereign and the creditors over the terms of restructuring, with super-majority voting on acceptance of any restructuring plan. Once accepted, creditors could not holdout by asking courts to enforce the original terms of their debt instruments. The article also explores whether more widespread use of collective action clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds would be an alternative to SDRM. The article proposes that credible restraints be placed on IMF and official lending since without such constraints sovereigns will not have sufficient incentives to restructure. It further proposes that the G-7 efforts to encourage CACs be abandoned since they will not be adopted and cannot solve the restructuring problem. It then recommends a modified SDRM that is more creditor friendly. The modifications would require: (1) the development of a benchmark on debt valuation to insure creditors receive fair value in a reorganization; (2) the inclusion of all debt, except secured debt, in the process - specifically multilateral, official and domestic debt - to eliminate debt discrimination; (3) the use of cramdown; and (4) minimization of the role of the IMF.
Hal S. Scott, How Would a New Bankruptcy Regime Help? (Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, no. 1, 2002).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Corporate Law & Securities
Sub-Categories:
Corporate Bankruptcy & Reorganization
,
Corporate Law
,
International Monetary Systems
Type: Article
Hal S. Scott & Philip A. Wellons, International Securities Regulation (Found. Press 2002).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Securities Law & Regulation
,
International Law
Type: Book
Abstract
This casebook is designed to be used in conjunction with a general securities regulation course or a separate course on international securities regulation. Part One overs securities regulation in the three major markets in the world: the United States, the European Union, and Japan. Part Two deals with international and offshore markets, and Part Three deals with two important infastructure topics, capital adequacy and clearance and settlement.
Hal S. Scott, The Internationalization of Primary Public Securities Markets, 63 Law & Contemp. Probs. 71 (2000).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Corporate Law & Securities
Sub-Categories:
Securities Law & Regulation
,
International Monetary Systems
Type: Article
Euro: Law and Market Practices (Hal S. Scott ed., Oceana 1999).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
European Law
,
International Monetary Systems
Type: Book
Hal S. Scott, When The Euro Falls Apart, 1 Int. Fin. 207 (1998).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Corporate Law & Securities
Sub-Categories:
Finance
,
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Financial Reform
,
Corporate Law
,
International Monetary Systems
,
European Law
Type: Article
David C. Cole, Hal. S. Scott & Phiilip A. Wellons, Asian Money Markets (Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
International Monetary Systems
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Book
Abstract
The countries of East and Southeast Asia have the world's most dynamic money markets. Essential to the Asian economy, their performance plays a crucial role in the successful development of other financial markets, such as those for business and consumer loans. This original study of the effect of government policy on the performance of money markets in the economies of this region (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and South Korea) is the only comprehensive book addressing this topic available today. Individual chapters were written by experts in the field, and were guided by a common research methodology. This book will be of great value to Pacific Basin specialists, bankers, academics, and public policy planners in finance.
Hal S. Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Basle Accord, 39 St. Louis U. L.J. 885 (1995).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Banking
,
Risk Regulation
,
Comparative Law
,
International Monetary Systems
Type: Article
Hal S. Scott, Supervision of International Banking Post-BCCI, 8 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 487 (1992).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Banking
,
Risk Regulation
,
International Monetary Systems
Type: Article
Hal S. Scott, The State of Banking in Developing Countries, in Essays on Comparative Commercial and Consumer Law 87 (Donald B. King ed., 1992).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Banking
,
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Developing & Emerging Nations
,
Comparative Law
,
International Monetary Systems
Type: Book
Abstract
Papers from the Fourth Biannual Conference of the International Academy of Commercial and Consumer Law, Melbourne, Australia, August 1988.
Hal S. Scott & Sydney J. Key, International Trade in Banking Services: A Conceptual Framework (Group of Thirty, Occasional Papers No. 35, 1991).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Banking
,
International Trade
,
Trade Regulation
Type: Article
Hal S. Scott, The Role of the European System of Central Banks in the Payment System, in The Economic and Monetary Union: The Political Dimension 101 (Comm. for the Monetary Union of Eur. 1991).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Banking
,
European Law
,
International Monetary Systems
Type: Book
Hal S. Scott, Commentary, An Evaluation of the Case for Receiver Finality, in The United States Payment System: Efficiency, Risk and the Role of the Federal Reserve 181 (David B. Humphrey ed., 1990).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Banking
,
Financial Markets & Institutions
Type: Book
Abstract
Proceedings of a Symposium on the U.S. Payment System sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. This commentary evaluates the case for mandating a receiver finality rule requiring banks to give customers unconditional credit at the time accounts are credited for incoming funds transfers but before settlement occurs. This rule would prevent banks from contracting with customers to make credits conditional on settlement. The commentary begins by showing that the importance of receiver finality depends on the degree of settlement finality. It then examines the basic economics of risk reduction in a funds transfer network and concludes that there is no need to displace contracts as to receiver finality under perfect market assumptions. It then examines whether there are market imperfections—externalities, misperceptions of risk, or the presence of a Fed settlement guarantee—which justify such displacement. It acknowledges that the presence of a widely perceived Fed guarantee gives inadequate incentives for risk reduction efforts by banks but concludes that mandated receiver finality is not the answer to this problem.
Hal S. Scott, Deregulation and Access to the Payment System, 23 Harv. J. on Legis. 331 (1986).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Banking
Type: Article
Abstract
The market for financial services in the United States has long been characterized by a series of federally-imposed geographic restrictions and service-market divisions. Congress enacted these restrictions to prevent both banks and their holding companies from engaging in certain business activities and to restrict their ability to expand across state lines. Because such restrictions have substantial anti-competitive effects, and are not necessary to protect the safety and soundness of depository institutions themselves, this Policy Essay proposes the repeal of current regulations of the activities of bank holding companies. At the same time, the payment system — various arrangements for transferring value, other than cash, between two parties — must be protected from the unacceptable risks of deregulation by prohibiting unregulated depository institution affiliates from processing payments through commonly owned depository institutions.
Hal S. Scott, Legal Education: Proposal for Change, 8 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 317 (1985).
Categories:
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
Legal Education
Type: Article
Hal S. Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers and the Uniform New Payments Code, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1664 (1983).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Corporate Law & Securities
Sub-Categories:
Banking
,
Corporate Law
Type: Article
Hal S. Scott, Risk Fixers, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1978).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Banking
,
Commercial Law
,
Contracts
,
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Risk Regulation
Type: Article
Abstract
Novel legal problems presented by the recent emergence of new payment systems have prompted some to call for revision of article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Others suggest that private contract can deal with the issues raised by most new commercial transactions. In this Article, Professor Scott examines the emergence of the first banking code in order to explain why private contract did not develop to govern payment transactions. He suggests that commercial statutes have been not as much embodiments of the law merchant as devices for allocating risk among transactors. Drawing on historical analysis, Scott identifies a number of factors present in the new payment systems which may lead to the adoption of new risk-fixing commercial legislation.