Published from to
Publication Types
Categories
J. Mark Ramseyer, Second-Best Justice: The Virtues of Japanese Private Law (Univ. of Chi. Press 2015).
Categories:
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Consumer Finance
,
Property Law
Sub-Categories:
Torts
,
Litigation & Settlement
,
Torts - Product Liability
,
Torts - Negligence
,
Private Law
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Comparative Law
,
Civil Law
Type: Book
Abstract
It’s long been known that Japanese file fewer lawsuits per capita than Americans do. Yet explanations for the difference have tended to be partial and unconvincing, ranging from circular arguments about Japanese culture to suggestions that the slow-moving Japanese court system acts as a deterrent. With Second-Best Justice, J. Mark Ramseyer offers a more compelling, better-grounded explanation: the low rate of lawsuits in Japan results not from distrust of a dysfunctional system but from trust in a system that works—that sorts and resolves disputes in such an overwhelmingly predictable pattern that opposing parties rarely find it worthwhile to push their dispute to trial. Using evidence from tort claims across many domains, Ramseyer reveals a court system designed not to find perfect justice, but to “make do”—to adopt strategies that are mostly right and that thereby resolve disputes quickly and economically. An eye-opening study of comparative law, Second-Best Justice will force a wholesale rethinking of the differences among alternative legal systems and their broader consequences for social welfare.
Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Fable of the Keiretsu: Urban Legends of the Japanese Economy (Univ. of Chi. Press 2006).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Corporate Law & Securities
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Banking
,
Finance
,
Business Organizations
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Book
Abstract
For Western economists and journalists, the most distinctive facet of the post-war Japanese business world has been the keiretsu, or the insular business alliances among powerful corporations. Within keiretsu groups, argue these observers, firms preferentially trade, lend money, take and receive technical and financial assistance, and cement their ties through cross-shareholding agreements. In The Fable of the Keiretsu, Yoshiro Miwa and J. Mark Ramseyer demonstrate that all this talk is really just urban legend. In their insightful analysis, the authors show that the very idea of the keiretsu was created and propagated by Marxist scholars in post-war Japan. Western scholars merely repatriated the legend to show the culturally contingent nature of modern economic analysis. Laying waste to the notion of keiretsu, the authors debunk several related “facts” as well: that Japanese firms maintain special arrangements with a “main bank,” that firms are systematically poorly managed, and that the Japanese government guided post-war growth. In demolishing these long-held assumptions, they offer one of the few reliable chronicles of the realities of Japanese business. Awarded the Masahiro Ohira Memorial Prize in 2007.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Measuring Judicial Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in Japan (Univ. of Chi. Press 2003).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Book
Abstract
The role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election raised questions in the minds of many Americans about the relationships between judges and political influence; the following years saw equally heated debates over the appropriate role of political ideology in selecting federal judges. Legal scholars have always debated these questions—asking, in effect, how much judicial systems operate on merit and principle and how much they are shaped by politics. The Japanese Constitution, like many others, requires that all judges be "independent in the exercise of their conscience and bound only by this Constitution and its laws." Consistent with this requirement, Japanese courts have long enjoyed a reputation for vigilant independence—an idea challenged only occasionally, and most often anecdotally. But in this book, J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen use the latest statistical techniques to examine whether that reputation always holds up to scrutiny—whether, and to what extent, the careers of lower court judges can be manipulated to political advantage. On the basis of careful econometric analysis of career data for hundreds of judges, Ramseyer and Rasmusen find that Japanese politics do influence judicial careers, discreetly and indirectly: judges who decide politically charged cases in ways favored by the ruling party enjoy better careers after their decisions than might otherwise be expected, while dissenting judges are more likely to find their careers hampered by assignments to less desirable positions. Ramseyer and Rasmusen's sophisticated yet accessible analysis has much to offer anyone interested in either judicial independence or the application of econometric techniques in the social sciences.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Outcaste Politics and Organized Crime in Japan: The Effect of Terminating Ethnic Subsidies (Harv. L. Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 932, Kelley Sch. of Bus. Res. Paper No. 17-68, Sept. 7, 2017).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Criminal Law & Procedure
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Organized Crime
,
Race & Ethnicity
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Other
Abstract
In 1969, Japan launched a massive subsidy program for the "burakumin" outcastes. The subsidies attracted the mob, and the higher incomes now available through organized crime compensated those burakumin who abandoned the legal sector for criminal careers. In the process, the subsidies gave new support to the tendency many Japanese already had to equate the burakumin with the mob. The government ended the subsidies in 2002. We explore the effect of the termination by merging 30 years of municipality data with a long-suppressed 1936 census of burakumin neighborhoods. First, we find that outmigration from municipalities with more burakumin increased after the end of the program. Apparently, the higher illegal income generated by the subsidies had restrained young burakumin from joining mainstream society. Second, we find that once the mob-tied corruption and extortion associated with the subsidies neared its end, real estate prices rose in municipalities with burakumin neighborhoods. With the subsidies gone and the mob in retreat, other Japanese found the formerly burakumin communities increasingly attractive places to live.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Are Reactors Like Casinos? A Culture of Dependency in Japan (Univ. Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 798, Mar. 1, 2017).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Law & Economics
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Other
Abstract
Japanese communities with nuclear reactors have the reactors because they applied for them, and they applied for them for the money. Among Japanese municipalities, they were some of the most dysfunctional before the reactors had even arrived. Communities depend on young families for the social capital that holds them intact, and these were the communities from which those families had already begun to leave. After the reactors arrived, young families continued to disappear. Unemployment rose. Divorce rates climbed. And in time, the communities had little -- other than reactor-revenue -- to which they could turn.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Nuclear Reactors in Japan: Who Asks for Them, What Do They Do?, Eur. J.L. & Econ. (forthcoming 2017).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Law & Economics
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Japanese communities with nuclear reactors have them because they applied for them, and they applied for them for the money. Among Japanese municipalities, they were some of the most dysfunctional before the reactors had even arrived. These were the villages that had long fought for targeted subsidies, but ignored infrastructural investments. Subsidies operate as a regressive tax on out-migration, of course, and the lack of private-sector infrastructure reduces the returns to high-value human capital. As a result, these were the villages from which the most talented young people had probably begun to disappear—even before the reactors arrived. After the communities built the reactors, talented young people continued to leave. Unemployment rose. Divorce rates climbed. And in time, the communities had little other than reactor-revenue on which to rely.
J. Mark Ramseyer, The Sins of Their Fathers: Illegitimacy in Japan and Surrogate Punishment across Generations, in The Timing of Lawmaking 322 (Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore eds., 2017).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Family Law
,
Property Law
Sub-Categories:
Domestic Relations
,
Children's Law & Welfare
,
Comparative Law
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Property Rights
Type: Book
Abstract
In late 2013, the Japanese Supreme Court voided inheritance rules giving non-marital children half the shares of their marital half-siblings. To punish children for the sins of their parents, it explained, violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Like the stigma that most traditional societies attached to illegitimacy, the inheritance rules had reflected a simple selection bias: the societies that survive are those where more children live to reproductive age; in harsh environments (the norm until a few centuries ago) whether children survived turned on the level of investment adults made in them; men tend not to invest in children whose paternity they do not know; hence, non-marital children had been substantially less likely to survive; but the stigma attached to illegitimacy and the accompanying legal disabilities had helped minimize the number of such children by channeling sex into stable dyadic relationships. The pre-2013 inheritance rule had promoted that relational stability by helping women hold men to their promises. In order to induce women to marry them, men routinely promise to invest in the children they bear together. The earlier rule had assured women that if their husbands breached those promises in life, they could at least trust the law to favor their children in his death. After 2013, the courts could no longer offer even that assurance.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Nuclear Power and the Mob: Extortion in Japan, 13 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 487 (2016).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Criminal Law & Procedure
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Environmental Law
Sub-Categories:
Organized Crime
,
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Energy & Utilities Law
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Nuclear reactors entail massive nontransferrable site-specific investments. The resulting appropriable quasi-rents offer the mob a lucrative target. In exchange for large fees, it can either promise to “protect” the utility (and silence the reactor's local opponents) or “extort” from it (and desist from inciting those opponents). Using prefecture-level Japanese panel data covering the years 1980 to 2010, I find that extortion rates rise when a utility announces plans to build a reactor. The evidence is consistent with a straightforward account: once news about a utility's plans to build a new reactor leaks, the mob moves in to appropriate the large quasi-rents from the utility, and stays to do what it does everywhere else—extort regular payments from local businesses. Reprint in the Japanese Journal of Law forthcoming (2017).
J. Mark Ramseyer, Liability for Defective Products: Comparative Hypotheses and Evidence from Japan, in Products Liability: Problems and Process 550 (James Henderson, Aaron Twerski & Douglas Kysar eds., 8th ed. 2016).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
Sub-Categories:
Torts - Product Liability
,
Comparative Law
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Book
Abstract
Products Liability: Problems and Process offers a problem-based approach that balances doctrine with in-depth exercises that prompt students to apply the law in realistic fact scenarios. Rules and comments from the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability—for which two of the authors, James Henderson and Aaron Twerski, have served as co-reporters—are fully integrated throughout the text. Brief dialogs among the three authors present a range of perspectives on controversial issues within the field to help stimulate reflection and discussion. The book concludes with a chapter on products liability in a global context. New to the 8th Edition: • substantial reorganization of material resulting in a slimmer, more user-friendly volume; • fully updated notes and cases in every chapter, including the latest scholarly commentary; • several new problem exercises and author dialogues throughout the book; • complete revision of preemption coverage and analysis; and • addition of a new co-author, Doug Kysar.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Lowering the Bar to Raise the Bar: Licensing Difficulty and Attorney Quality in Japan, 41 J. Japanese Stud. 113 (2015).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Legal Education
Type: Article
Abstract
By easing the difficulty of the Japanese bar-exam equivalent, recent changes increased the quality of young lawyers. The result is counterintuitive, but a relaxation in a licensing standard can have this effect if it lowers the costs to taking a test enough to increase the number and quality of the people willing to go to the trouble of sitting for it. We explore the theoretical circumstances under which this phenomenon can occur and discuss the evidence that this is indeed what happened in Japan.
Lisa Bernstein, Alan Morrison & J. Mark Ramseyer, Private Orderings, 7 J. Legal Analysis 247 (2015).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Dispute Resolution
,
Litigation & Settlement
,
Negotiation & Alternative Dispute Resolution
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
Type: Article
J. Mark Ramseyer, Social Capital and the Formal Legal System: Evidence from Prefecture-Level Data in Japan, 7 J. Legal Analysis 421 (2015).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Dispute Resolution
,
Litigation & Settlement
,
Negotiation & Alternative Dispute Resolution
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Empirical Legal Studies
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Verifiable proxies for social capital potentially provide an empirically tractable way to identify environments where social norms both constrain behavior and substitute for judicial enforcement. Using regression and factor analysis with Japanese prefecture-level data, I explore several aspects of this possibility. I first note that people in prefectures with high levels of social capital more readily comply with a wide range of low-level legal mandates. Conditional on levels of economic welfare, I further find that: (i) firms in prefectures with low levels of social capital are more likely to default on their contracts, (ii) residents in low social-capital prefectures are more likely to litigate, (iii) creditors of distressed debtors in low social-capital prefectures are more likely to petition a court for enforcement orders, and (iv) distressed debtors in low social-capital prefectures are more likely to file in court for bankruptcy protection.
J. Mark Ramseyer, The Fable of Land Reform: Leases and Credit Markets in Occupied Japan, 24 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 934 (2015).
Categories:
Environmental Law
,
Property Law
,
Banking & Finance
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Finance
,
Agriculture Law
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Developing & Emerging Nations
,
Real Estate
,
Property Rights
Type: Article
Abstract
Development officials and scholars routinely argue that land reform can raise productivity. It may not always do so, they write, but it can—and during 1947–1950 in Japan it did. Land reform may sometimes raise productivity, but it did not raise it in Japan. The claim that it did is a fable, a tale people tell and re-tell only because they wish it were true. A lease is a credit transaction—a way for local elites (tied to local information networks in ways that banks can never be) to extend funds to farmers. Elites could lend money directly, but would need to create a security interest to protect their loans. Doing so requires legal procedures, however, and most local elites in prewar Japan lacked the university education necessary to manipulate those procedures. By contrast, a lease lets local elites protect their funds simply by retaining the right to evict tenants who fail to pay. As such, it represents a way for investors and farmers jointly to economize on credit market costs. The Japanese land reform program effectively banned this transaction-cost economizing credit-market strategy, expropriated the wealth of the investors who used it—and cut the rate of growth in agricultural productivity.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Yoshiro Miwa, 2014 kaisha ho kaisei, "koporeto gabanansu kodo" to "shagai torishimariyaku" [The 2014 Amendments to the Corporate Code, "the Corporate Governance Code," and "Outside Directors], 28 Osaka gakuin daigaku keizai ronshu 15 (Oct. 2015) (written in Japanese).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Finance
,
Financial Reform
,
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Securities Law & Regulation
,
Corporate Governance
,
Shareholders
,
Corporate Law
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Comparative Law
,
Foreign Law
Type: Other
Abstract
As of June 1, 2015, the Tokyo Stock Exchange mandated a "corporate governance code" on firms that would list their stock on its exchange. In effective, the code required most listed firms to appoint outside directors to their boards. The code itself was the output of a study committee organized under the auspices of the Financial Service Agency and the Exchange. And it had as its formal impetus the 2014 amendments to the Corporate Code that increased pressure on firms to appoint outside directors. The mandates trace their origins to debates within other countries over corporate governance, and to the on-going political disputes over reviving Japanese economic growth. In this article, we explore four questions relating to the mandate: (a) what do the outside director mandates actually require, (b) who actually decides the substance of the mandate, (c) what process resulted in the mandate, and (4) what relation does the mandate bear to economic theory and empirical research? By standard economic theory, market pressure will push shareholders to select those directors (whether insiders or outsiders) who most effectively increase stockholder wealth. To mandate the appointment of anyone else (again, whether insiders or outsiders) will necessarily cause stockholder welfare to fall. The proponents of the new mandate argued aggressively that that it would stimulate the Japanese economy. We suspect they will soon adopt other measures that require outside directors even more rigidly. Nothing in economic theory or research, however, provides any support for their claims. Also available at: 28 Osaka gakuin daigaku keizai ronshu 15 (2015) (written in Japanese).
J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Measuring Voter Ideology: Descriptive Regression Measurement of the Left-Right Spectrum (June 9, 2015).
Categories:
Government & Politics
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Elections & Voting
,
Congress & Legislation
Type: Other
Abstract
For scholars studying the political attitudes of the general public, someone’s position on the ideological spectrum is a good place to start. Typically, scholars identify that position through factor analysis on survey questions, making the assumption that the most important artificially constructed factor indicates the person’s position on the liberal-conservative spectrum. The leading attitudinal surveys, however— the GSS, the CCES, and the ANES— include a variable giving a respondent’s self-identified ideology, a variable given no special prominence by factor analysis. We suggest a new ideology measure: the individual’s fitted value from a regression of self-identified ideology on other variables. We describe various ways to choose those other variables. This approach gives proper priority to the usefulness of self-reported ideology. It lets us test whether voters identify their own ideology through identity-group variables; avoids the bias introduced in choosing which issue variables to include in factor analysis; and shows which positions the average American— as opposed to the analyst— thinks define “liberal” and “conservative”.
William A. Klein, J. Mark Ramseyer & Stephen M. Bainbridge, Cases and Materials on Business Associations: Agency, Partnerships, LLCs, and Corporations (Found. Press 9th ed. 2015).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Banking & Finance
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
Finance
,
Business Organizations
,
Corporate Law
,
Mergers & Acquisitions
,
Legal Education
Type: Book
Abstract
"The ninth edition preserves the authors' tradition of providing a comprehensive overview of agency, partnership, and corporation law. It also continues to emphasize six basic editorial principles: Be lean but not mean, cases edited ruthlessly to produce a readable and concise result. Facts matter, so they are included in all their potential ambiguity. Bring a planner's perspective to the table through extensive use of transactionally-oriented problems. It's a casebook not a treatise. No long, stultifying textual passages. Provide the cases and let the individual teacher use them as he or she sees fit. Try to find cases that are fun to teach. Great facts or a clever analysis are always given first priority in case selection. Provide a teachers' manual that goes into great depth, with analysis of every case and, whenever applicable, offering the disparate views of each author." --Publisher Supplements (1993, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2008, 2010, and 2014); Teachers' Manual with Supplements (1991, 1993, 1998, 1999, and 2001); and annual Statutory Supplement.
Bruce E. Aronson, Kenneth Ayotte, Takaaki Eguchi, David Gamage, Mark P. Gergen, Gen Goto, Benjamin E. Hermalin, Yohsuke Higashi, Akio Hoshi, Hidefusa Iida, Hideshi Itoh, Takahito Kato, Nobuo Matsuki, Manabu Matsunaka, Curtis J. Milhaupt, Hiroshi Mitoma, Hideaki Miyajima, Sadakazu Osaki, J. Mark Ramseyer, Shruti Rana, Roberta Romano, Takuji Saito, Kenichi Sekiguchi, Masakazu Shirai, Zenichi Shishido, Shinjiro Takagi, Wataru Tanaka, Takashi Toichi, Akira Tokosu, Hideaki Umetsu, J. H. Verkerke, Tetsuya Watanabe, and Noriyuki Yanagawa, Enterprise Law Conference of 2014: Edited Transcript (September 24, 2014).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
Consumer Finance
,
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Labor & Employment
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Taxation
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Banking
,
Commercial Law
,
Finance
,
Shareholders
,
Mergers & Acquisitions
,
Securities Law & Regulation
,
Corporate Governance
,
Corporate Bankruptcy & Reorganization
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Employment Practice
,
Retirement Benefits & Social Security
,
Labor Law
,
Tax Policy
,
Taxation - Corporate
,
Taxation - Federal
,
Taxation - Personal Income
Type: Article
Abstract
Two persistent questions of enterprise law are raised and addressed: First, how does law matter to business practice? Second, how can we make law that stimulates economic efficiency? These questions are difficult to answer because of two important complementarities: the complementarity between areas of law within a country’s legal regime and the complementarity between law and other social environments such as markets and social norms. Over the course of the two-day conference, academics and practitioners from the U.S. and Japan in the areas of corporate law, securities regulation, labor law (including both employment protection law and labor union law), bankruptcy law, and tax law investigate the ways that enterprise law affects practice complementarily with markets and social norms. A key analytical framework is introduced, in which the business enterprise is viewed as an incentive mechanism among the four indispensable capital providers of the firm: management, employees, shareholders, and creditors. Only through close attention to the incentive bargain between these four players can optimal legislative design and economic efficiency be achieved.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Exclusive Dealing: Before, Bork, and Beyond, 57 J.L. & Econ. S145 (2014).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Banking & Finance
,
Corporate Law & Securities
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Antitrust & Competition Law
,
Law & Economics
Type: Article
Abstract
Antitrust scholars have come to accept the basic ideas about exclusive dealing that Bork articulated in The Antitrust Paradox. Indeed, they have even extended his list of reasons why exclusive dealing can promote economic efficiency. Yet they have also taken up his challenge to explain when exclusive dealing might possibly cause harm and have modeled a variety of special cases where it does. Some (albeit not all) of these are sufficiently plausible to be useful to prosecutors and judges.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Litigation and Social Capital: Divorces and Traffic Accidents in Japan, 11 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 39 (2014).
Categories:
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Dispute Resolution
,
Litigation & Settlement
,
Negotiation & Alternative Dispute Resolution
,
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Using regression and factor analysis with prefecture-level data, I ask whether Japanese in communities with high levels of “social capital” more readily settle their disputes out of court. Although studies of litigation rates often measure suits per capita, the more appropriate measure may involve suits per “dispute.” We lack information about the number of disputes in many fields, but we do have it for Japanese divorces and traffic accidents—and I focus on those two sets of disputes. Disputes over divorce and traffic accidents differ fundamentally, and social capital does not lower litigation rates among either. I find that: (1) couples in communities with low social capital are more apt to divorce; (2) couples in low-social-capital communities are not more likely to litigate their disputes; (3) couples in communities with more lawyers are not more likely to litigate their divorces; and (4) parties in communities with low social capital are not more likely to litigate their disputes over traffic accidents; but (5) parties in communities with more lawyers are indeed more likely to litigate their disputes over those accidents.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Biases that Blind: Professor Hyman and the University, 2014 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1229.
Categories:
Legal Profession
,
Health Care
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Law & Behavioral Sciences
,
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Health Law & Policy
,
Legal Education
,
Legal History
Type: Article
Abstract
This Essay is a response to Professor Hyman’s piece, Why Did Law Professors Misunderestimate the Lawsuits Against PPACA. In this Essay, Ramseyer argues that the statements made by law professors about the constitutionality of the PPACA often reflected partisan loyalty more than thoughtful legal analysis.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Bottom-Feeding at the Bar: Usury Law and Value-Dissipating Attorneys in Japan, in Festschrift zu Ehren von Christian Kirchner [Festschrift in Honor of Christian Kirchner] 135 (Wolf A. Kaal, Matthias Schmidt & Andreas Schwartze eds., 2014).
Categories:
Legal Profession
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Consumer Finance
Sub-Categories:
Consumer Protection Law
,
Comparative Law
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Legal Services
Type: Book
Abstract
Critics have long complained that lawyers dissipate value. Some do, of course. Some legal work dissipates more value than others, and the lawyers who focus on the most notorious rent-seeking sectors extract a heavy toll in the U.S. Whether lawyers choose to focus on value-dissipating or value-enhancing work depends on the institutional structure in place, and the American legal system apparently generates high returns to value-dissipating work. The Japanese legal system traditionally holds down such returns, and Japanese attorneys have invested much less in those sectors. In 2006, the Japanese Supreme Court unilaterally invented an entirely new field of rent-seeking: it construed usury law to let borrowers sue for refunds of "excessive" interest they had explicitly and knowingly -- and with statutory authorization -- agreed to pay. Although borrowers swamped the courts with refund claims, the field did not attract either experienced or talented attorneys. Instead, it attracted two groups: new lawyers who had entered the bar under the relaxed licensing standards, and the least talented lawyers. At least in this sector of the rent-seeking field, the returns to experience and talent in Japan apparently remain lower than in value-enhancing sectors of the bar.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Are Americans More Litigious? Some Quantitative Evidence, in The American Illness: Essays on the Rule of Law 69 (F. H.Buckley ed., 2013).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Litigation & Settlement
,
Class Action Litigation
,
Courts
,
Comparative Law
Type: Book
Abstract
Many observers suggest that American citizens sue more readily than citizens elsewhere, and that American judges shape society more powerfully than judges elsewhere. We examine the problems involved in exploring these questions quantitatively. The data themselves indicate that American law’s notoriety does not result from how we handle routine disputes. Instead, it results from the peculiar and dysfunctional way American courts handle particular legal doctrines like class actions.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Insider Trading Regulation in Japan, in Research Handbook on Insider Trading 347 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2013).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Corporate Law & Securities
Sub-Categories:
Securities Law & Regulation
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Comparative Law
Type: Book
Abstract
The U.S.-controlled occupation imposed on Japan in the late 1940s an American-style securities statute. The U.S. statute did not ban insider trading at the time, and neither did the new Japanese law. Not until the 1960s did U.S. prosecutors and judges start to criminalize insider trading. Their Japanese counterparts did not follow their lead, and as of the mid-1980s had left insider trading largely unpoliced. In 1988, the Japanese Diet banned and criminalized insider trading. Rather than use a vague rule like 10b-5, it carefully specified which investors, which trades, and which contexts would trigger the ban. In 2004, it added an administrative surcharge regime. Commentators in Japan ostensibly urged the Diet to adopt the bill because they hoped to restore investor confidence in the stock market. If the ban restored investor confidence, it did not show. Shortly after the ban took effect, the Japanese stock market collapsed.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Liability for Defective Products: Comparative Hypotheses and Evidence from Japan, 61 Am. J. Comp. L. 617 (2013).
Categories:
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Torts - Product Liability
,
Empirical Legal Studies
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Americans file 80,000 product liability suits a year; Japanese file perhaps 100-300; and most countries more closely resemble Japan than the United States. Based on reports and articles from forty-five countries, Mathias Reimann has advanced several thoughtful and subtle hypotheses about this contrast. In this article, I apply Reimann's hypotheses to Japan and explore what they might tell us about law in the two countries. As Reimann suggested, the reason for the Japanese-American contrast does not lie in legal doctrine: on the substantive law of products liability, the United States and Japan are quite close. Instead, the reasons for the contrast seem to turn on aspects of American procedure that encourage meritless demands. Litigation rates are not lower in Japan because the law prevents victims from recovering their damages; Japanese law does not deter valid claims. Instead, the rates are higher in the United States because American law helps claimants collect amounts to which they are not legally entitled.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Business Organizations (Wolters Kluwer Law & Bus. 2012).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Finance
,
Business Organizations
,
Securities Law & Regulation
,
Corporate Law
,
Mergers & Acquisitions
,
Fiduciaries
Type: Book
Abstract
Elegantly written, thoughtful and often amusing, Business Organizations analyzes the law of business organizations: corporate law, partnership and LLC law, agency, and selected aspects of securities regulation. In clean, uncomplicated prose, the text offers a clear and thoughtful overview. Business Organizations explains the structure of the law itself, placing it within an historical context, and outlines its economic effect. Integrating basic principles of business and finance in an unintimidating, uncomplicated manner, the text engages readers who have either an elemental or a sophisticated grasp of economics. Various pedagogical features support learning and facilitate use, such as the overview in each chapter, giving an over-arching, synthetic account of the law with the details on which many instructors focus. The book propels the analysis with an extensive use of hypothetical examples. The comprehensive coverage embraces all of the principal cases in the main casebooks, and goes beyond to explain what each case decided and why it matters. The authors explores what motivated the parties' actions, and why the judges held as they did. Second edition forthcoming (expected in 2017).
J. Mark Ramseyer, Talent Matters: Judicial Productivity and Speed in Japan, 32 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 38 (2012).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Legal Profession
,
Government & Politics
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Torts - Negligence
,
Litigation & Settlement
,
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Legal Services
Type: Article
Abstract
To study the determinants of judicial productivity and speed (measured by published opinions), I examine all 348 trial-court civil medical malpractice opinions published in Japan between 1995 and 2004. For comparative purposes, I add 120 randomly selected civil judgments from the same period. The data cover 706 judges (about a third of the Japanese bench). I find: (A) Productivity correlates with apparent intellectual ability and effort. The judges who attended the most selective universities, who passed the bar exam most quickly, and who were chosen by the courts for an elite career track publish the most opinions. (B) Adjudicatory speed correlates with apparent ability and effort too, but institutional experience counts as well. As the courts acquired increasing experience with malpractice cases, the pace of adjudication quickened.
William A. Klein, J. Mark Ramseyer & Stephen M. Bainbridge, Agency, Partnerships, and Limited Liability Entities: Unincorporated Business Associations (Found. Press 3d ed. 2012).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
Sub-Categories:
Business Organizations
Type: Book
Abstract
"This book is a collection of edited cases, original text, questions, and problems designed for use in a law school level course on agency, partnerships, and limited liability entities. A key feature of this casebook is the extensive coverage of limited liability entities, especially unincorporated limited liability companies (LLCs). The authors include cases on such LLC topics as formation, interpretation of the operating agreement, piercing the LLC "veil," fiduciary obligation, expulsion of an LLC member, and dissolution. Also included is a section on the question of whether membership interests in LLCs and limited partnerships are a security." --Publisher Related Teacher's Manual (3d ed. 2012).
Curtis J. Milhaupt, J. Mark Ramseyer & Mark West, The Japanese Legal System: Cases, Codes, and Commentary (Found. Press 2d ed. 2012).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Legal Education
Type: Book
Abstract
This casebook on Japanese Law has been specially designed for ease of use and theoretical versatility. Heavily-edited cases, statutes, and articles canvass a wide range of intriguing problems and theoretical perspectives. Professors will find that it facilitates a variety of analysis and approaches to a given question--whether sociological, anthropological, or based on law and economics. The book allows for in-depth coverage of a diverse range of substantive areas of law, from torts, criminal law, and contracts to employment and corporate law.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of Japan, 13 Theoretical Inquiries L. 457 (2012).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Corporate Law
,
Remedies
,
Torts - Business
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and thirty-eightmeter high tsunami destroyed Tokyo Electric’s Fukushima nuclear power complex. The disaster was not a high-damage, low-probability event. It was a high-damage, high-probability event. Massive earthquakes and tsunamis assault the coast every century. Tokyo Electric built its reactors as it did because it would not pay the full cost of a meltdown anyway. Given the limited liability at the heart of corporate law, it could externalize the cost of running reactors. In most industries, firms rarely risk tort damages so enormous they cannot pay them. In nuclear power, “unpayable” potential liability is routine. Privately owned companies bear the costs of an accident only up to the fire-sale value of their net assets. Beyond that, they pay nothing — and the damages from a nuclear disaster easily soar past that point. Government ownership could eliminate this moral hazard — but it would replace it with problems of its own. Unfortunately, the electoral dynamics in wealthy modern democracies combine to replicate nearly perfectly the moral hazard inherent in private ownership. Private firms will build reactors on fault lines — but so will governments. Anticipated to be reprinted as a chapter in a book edited by J. Weitzdoerfer, to be published by Cambridge University Press in 2018.
Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Executive Compensation in Japan: Estimating Levels and Determinants from Tax Records, 20 J. Econ. & Mgmt Strategy 843 (2011).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Labor & Employment
,
Taxation
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Empirical Legal Studies
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Executive Compensation
,
Taxation - Personal Income
Type: Article
Abstract
Most studies of executive compensation have data on pay but not total income. Because exchange-listed Japanese firms (unlike exchange-listed U.S. firms) need not disclose executive compensation figures in their securities filings, most studies on Japan lack even good data on pay. Through 2004, however, the Japanese tax office disclosed the tax liabilities of the 73,000 Japanese with the highest incomes. We obtained this data, and match the high-tax list against the list of CEOs of the firms listed in Section 1 of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. We thus estimate salaries and risk exposure in a new way. We confirm survey and anecdotal evidence that Japanese executives earn less than American—about one-fifth the pay, adjusting for firm size and outside income. Tobit regressions show that pay in Japan depends heavily on firm size (a .22 elasticity) and on accounting profitability, but not on stock returns. Additionally, family owned firms and those with large lead shareholders pay less to employee CEOs not in the family or with large shareholdings, as do firms whose directors have less tenure on the board.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Bennett Rasmussen, Can the Treasury Exempt its Own Companies from Tax? The $45 Billion GM NOL Carryforward, 1 Cato Papers Pub. Pol'y 1 (2011).
Categories:
Taxation
Sub-Categories:
Taxation - Corporate
,
Tax Policy
Type: Article
Abstract
To discourage firms from buying and selling tax deductions, Section 382 of the tax code limits the ability of one firm to use the ‘‘net operating losses’’ (NOLs) of another firm that it acquires. Under the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the U.S. Treasury lent a large amount of money to General Motors. In bankruptcy, it then transformed the debt into stock. GM did not make many cars anyone wanted to buy, but it did have $45 billion in NOLs. Unfortunately for the Treasury, if it now sold the stock it acquired in bankruptcy, it would trigger Sec. 382. Foreseeing this, the market would pay much less for its stock in GM. Treasury solved this problem by issuing a series of notices in which it announced that the law did not apply to itself. Sec. 382 says that the NOL limits apply when a firm’s ownership changes. That rule would not apply to any firm bought with TARP funds, declared Treasury. Notwithstanding the straightforward and all-inclusive statutory language, GM could use its NOLs in full after Treasury sold out. The Treasury issued similar notices about Citigroup and AIG. Treasury had no legal or economic justification for any of these notices, but the press did not notice. Precisely because they involved such arcane provisions of the corporate tax code, they largely escaped public attention. The losses to the public fisc were not minor — they cost the country billions of dollars in tax revenue. That the effect could be so large and yet so hidden illustrates the risk involved in this kind of tax manipulation. The more difficult the tax rule, the more easily the government can use it to hide the cost of its policies and subsidize favored groups. We suggest that Congress give its members standing to challenge unlegislated tax law changes in court.
John R. Lott, Jr., J. Mark Ramseyer & Jeffrey Standen, Peer Effects in Affirmative Action: Evidence from Law Student Performance, 31 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 1 (2011).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Legal Education
Type: Article
Abstract
In the Grutter case, Justice O'Connor suggested that universities could justifiably try to enroll a "critical mass" of minority students. Enroll fewer than that "critical mass," reason some observers, and minority students will feel too marginalized to perform at their highest levels. In this article, we test whether minority students perform better with other students from their ethnic group in a class or school. To do so, we assemble data on the ethnicity and performance of each student in all classes at two law schools - for three years at one, and for 16 years at the other. Although these schools enrolled a smaller fraction of African-Americans than most law schools, they are located in states with a much smaller fraction of African-Americans than in the United States as a whole. There is also a large amount of variation in the percent African-American across classes. At these schools, we find no consistent evidence that having additional students from one's ethnic group raises a student's performance. Instead, we find some evidence that having additional ethnic peers lowers performance - albeit by a very small amount.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Book Review, 66 Monumenta Nipponica 381 (2011) (reviewing Mark D. West, Lovesick Japan: Sex, Marriage, Romance, Law).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Family Law
Sub-Categories:
Domestic Relations
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
J. Mark Ramseyer, Law and Economics in Japan, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1455.
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Legal Profession
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Law & Economics
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Comparative Law
,
Legal Education
,
Legal Scholarship
Type: Article
Abstract
Although law & economics scholarship has grown rapidly in recent years, Japanese scholars (with prominent exceptions, to be sure) have embraced the approach less enthusiastically than their U.S. peers. I explore some "reasons" for this reticence -- particularly, the location of legal education in the undergraduate curriculum, and the long-term Marxist domination of economics faculties. Ultimately, these "explanations" remain unsatisfactory. The undergraduate location of law does not explain law & economics' reception across a broader sample of countries, or why universities keep law in these undergraduate departments in the first place. And Marxist dominance is not the cause of an intellectual outcome. Instead, it is itself an intellectual outcome. At root, the reason for the difficulty in explaining patterns of intellectual diffusion lies in the paucity of hard-edged incentives in higher education. Although universities compete, they do not compete with anything approaching the intensity of for-profit firms. As a result, the mechanisms behind the equilibrium outcomes we observe in economic markets simply do not apply in education. Lacking those mechanisms, universities might still converge on superior intellectual approaches. Or they might not.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Do School Cliques Dominate Japanese Bureaucracies? Evidence from Supreme Court Appointments, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1681 (2011).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Scholars (e.g., Chalmers Johnson) routinely argue that university cliques dominate Japanese firms and bureaucracies. The graduates of the most selective schools, they explain, control and manipulate their employer. They cause it to hire from their alma mater. They skew internal career dynamics to favor themselves. For most firms and bureaucracies, we lack the data on employee-level output necessary to test whether cliques do skew career tournaments. Because judges publish opinions, within the courts we may have what we need. In this article, I use data on published opinions to test whether Japanese judges from the most selective schools are more likely -- holding output constant -- to reach the Supreme Court. They are not. I find only weak evidence of possible favoritism toward Kyoto University graduates, and no evidence of favoritism toward Tokyo University graduates. Japanese judges do not find themselves named to the Court because of their school backgrounds. They find themselves named there because they are unusually productive.
Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, The Industrial Organization of the Japanese Bar: Levels and Determinants of Attorney Income, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 460 (2010).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Legal Services
,
Legal Education
Type: Article
Abstract
Using micro-level tax data on attorney incomes in 2004 (when the law was changed to make it confidential), we analyze the industrial organization of the Japanese bar. These data suggest two sources of high income: an idiosyncratic return to talent in Tokyo and a compensating differential for the lack of amenities in the provinces. The most able would-be lawyers (those with the highest opportunity costs) pass the bar-exam equivalent on one of their first tries or abandon the effort and pursue careers outside of law. If they pass, they opt for careers in Tokyo that involve complex litigation and business transactions. This work places a premium on their talent, and from it they earn appropriately high incomes. The less talented face lower opportunity costs and opt to spend many years studying for the exam. If they do eventually pass, they apparently choose between a relatively low-income career in Tokyo and a provincial career paying a compensating differential.
Minoru Nakazato & J. Mark Ramseyer, Tax Law, Hiroshi Kaneko, and the Transformation of Japanese Jurisprudence, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 721 (2010).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Legal Profession
,
Taxation
Sub-Categories:
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Biography & Tribute
,
Legal Scholarship
,
Tax Policy
Type: Article
Abstract
Interdisciplinary, wide-ranging, and flexible, contemporary Japanese legal scholarship is nothing like its antecedents thirty years ago. In significant part, it owes this modern sophistication to tax. More specifically, it owes its inter-disciplinary character to the work of Hiroshi Kaneko. When Kaneko came to Japanese tax law in the late 1950s, he came to a field like most other Japanese legal fields—intellectually isolated, and overwhelmingly doctrinal. Through a novel interpretive theory, Kaneko created a way for tax scholars to debate the economic substance of tax and income. In the process, he (a) created a field (tax law) where little had existed before, (b) brought public finance and the comprehensive tax base to the forefront, (c) kept Japanese public law practice anchored firmly in the rule of law, and yet (d) opened the door to social science in law more generally.
Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Good Occupation -- or Vindictive?, in Law and Practice in Postwar Japan: The Postwar Legal Reforms and Their Influence 66 (Blakemore Foundation, International House of Japan, 2010).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Legal History
,
Biography & Tribute
Type: Book
Abstract
From the proceedings of the Symposium Honoring the Contributions and Career of Thomas L. Blakemore : May 28-29, 2009.
J. Mark Ramseyer, The Effect of Universal Health Insurance on Malpractice Claims: The Japanese Experience, 2 J. Legal Analysis 621 (2010).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Health Care
Sub-Categories:
Torts - Negligence
,
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Health Law & Policy
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Japanese patients file relatively few medical malpractice claims. To date, scholars have tried to explain this phenomenon by identifying "faults" in the Japanese judicial system. They look in the wrong place. Largely, the faults they identify do not exist. To explore the reasons behind Japanese malpractice claiming patterns, I instead begin by identifying all malpractice suits that generated a published district court opinion between 1995 and 2004. I then combine the resulting micro-level dataset with aggregate data published by the courts, and publicly available information on the Japanese health care industry. I locate the explanation for the dearth in claims in the patterns of Japanese medical technology, and the reason for that technology in the national health insurance program. In order to contain the cost of its universal national health insurance plan, the Japanese government has radically suppressed the price it pays for the technologically most sophisticated procedures. Predictably as a result, Japanese doctors and hospitals have focused instead on more rudimentary - and more generously compensated - care. Yet, for reasons common to many societies, Japanese patients do not sue over rudimentary care. They sue the physicians who supply the most sophisticated care. Japanese patients bring relatively few malpractice suits because the government has (for reasons of cost) suppressed the volume of the services (namely, highly sophisticated services) that would otherwise generate the most malpractice claims.
Mikael Adolphson & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Competitive Enforcement of Property Rights in Medieval Japan: The Role of Temples and Monasteries, 71 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 660 (2009).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Property Law
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Legal History
,
Property Rights
Type: Article
Abstract
Medieval Japanese governments only haphazardly enforced claims to scarce resources. Necessarily, this presented landholders with a void. To obtain the enforcement they needed, many turned to institutions affiliated with the fractious Buddhist faith instead. Temples and monasteries enjoyed an exemption from tax on their lands and controlled an array of financial and human resources with which they could adjudicate and enforce claims to scarce resources. To obtain access to that exemption and those resources, landholders "commended" their rights in land to them, and paid them a share of the harvest. In exchange, the temples and monasteries exempted them from tax, adjudicated disputes internal to the estate and protected their estates against external threats. Effectively, the temples and monasteries competed in a market for basic governmental services. By helping to secure basic claims to property, the temples and monasteries helped to promote investment and growth; by competing against the government itself they helped to forestall the crippling effect of a predatory monopolistic state.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Sex Bias in the Japanese Courts, in Empirical Studies of Judicial Systems 197 (Kuo-Chang Huang ed., 2009).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Labor & Employment
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Courts
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Employment Discrimination
Type: Book
Abstract
Wolff (2007) argues that female judges in Japan experience statistically significant pay discrimination. To document his assertion, he compares the mean values for men and women among judges hired in the 1960s. I use multivariate regressions to test his claim with new data on all judges hired between 1978 and 1981. I find (a) that women brought qualifications comparable to the men, (b) that women received initial postings as attractive as the men, (c) that women accepted inter-city transfers in their careers at the same rates as the men, and (d) that women were not more likely to quit their jobs than the men. Although I find (i) that women were underrepresented among those judges who specialized in administrative rather than judicial work, I also find (ii) that women did not climb the pay scale significantly more slowly than the men. Wolff's pay discrimination results are apparently an artifact of an earlier era.
J. Mark Ramseyer, The Effect of Cost Suppression Under Universal Health Insurance on the Allocation of Talent and the Development of Expertise: Cosmetic Surgery in Japan, 52 J. L. & Econ. 497 (2009).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Health Care
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Law & Economics
,
Health Law & Policy
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Japanese national health insurance provides universal coverage. This system necessarily entails a subsidy that dramatically raises the demand for medical services. In the face of the increased demand, the government suppresses costs by suppressing prices. Through biographical and income data on more than 4,000 Tokyo physicians, I explore the effect of this price suppression on the allocation of talent and the development of expertise. Crucially, this national health insurance does not cover services—like elective cosmetic surgery—deemed medically superfluous. Facing price caps in the covered sector but competitive prices in these “superfluous” sectors, the most talented doctors disproportionately shift into the “superfluous” sectors and there invest heavily in their expertise: cosmetic surgeons are more likely than other doctors (more likely even than noncosmetic plastic surgeons) to have attended a more selective medical school, to have served on a medical school faculty, to be board certified, and to earn high incomes.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Universal Health Insurance and the Effect of Cost Containment on Mortality Rates: Strokes and Heart Attacks in Japan, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 309 (2009).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Health Care
Sub-Categories:
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Health Law & Policy
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
For more than four decades, Japan has offered universal health insurance. Despite the demand subsidy entailed, it has kept costs low by regulatorily capping the amounts it pays doctors, particularly for the most modern and sophisticated procedures. Facing subsidized demand but stringently capped prices on complex procedures, Japanese physicians have had little incentive to invest in specialized expertise. Instead, they have invested in small private clinics and hospitals. The resulting proliferation of primitive clinics and hospitals has cut both the number of complex modern medical procedures performed, and the number of hospitals with any substantial experience in those procedures. With a quarter of the heart disease in the United States, Japan performs less than 3 percent as many coronary bypass operations and less than 6 percent as many angioplasties. Of the 855 cities and regions in Japan, 77 percent lack any hospital with substantial experience in the sophisticated modern treatment (defined below) of cerebrovascular disease, and 89 percent lack much experience in angioplasties. In this article, I estimate one of the costs of this regulatorily-driven lack of expertise. Toward that end, I combine mortality data from 855 cities with information on local hospital expertise and local demographic composition. In the typical city, I find that the addition of one hospital with substantial experience in modern stroke treatment would cut annual stroke mortality by 7 to 16 deaths. The addition of one hospital with substantial experience in angioplasties would cut the annual deaths from heart attacks in the city by over 19.
Corporate Law Stories (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., Found. Press 2009).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
Corporate Law
,
Legal History
Type: Book
Abstract
Taking eleven pivotal cases that have shaped the evolution of corporate law, internationally renowned scholars explore the people behind the disputes, and the forces that led the judges to decide the cases the way they did. From Meinhard v. Salmon to Paramount v. QVC, they unravel the logic (and, often, apparent illogic) of the opinions. Simultaneously amusing and clarifying, the resulting chapters make sense of cases that have puzzled students and scholars for decades. Translated and published in Chinese (2012).
Eric Rasmusen, Manu Raghav & J. Mark Ramseyer, Convictions versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor's Choice, 11 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 47 (2009).
Categories:
Criminal Law & Procedure
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Criminal Prosecution
,
Law & Economics
,
Comparative Law
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
It is natural to suppose that a prosecutor’s conviction rate– the ratio of convictions to cases prosecuted– is a sign of his competence. Prosecutors, however, choose which cases to prosecute. If they prosecute only the strongest cases, they will have high conviction rates. Any system which pays attention to conviction rates, as opposed to the number of convictions, is liable to abuse. As a prosecutor’s budget increases, he allocates it between prosecuting more cases and putting more effort into existing cases. Either can be socially desirable, depending on particular circumstances. We model the trade-offs theoretically in two models, one of a benevolent social planner and one of a prosecutor who values not just the number of convictions but the conviction rate and unrelated personal goals. We apply the model to U.S. data drawn from county-level crime statistics and a survey of all state prosecutors by district. Conviction rates do have a small negative correlation with prosecutorial budgets, but conditioning on other variables in regression analysis, higher budgets are associated both with more prosecutions and higher conviction rates.
Minoru Nakazato & J. Mark Ramseyer, In Memoriam, Oliver Oldman, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1296 (2009).
Categories:
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
Legal Education
,
Biography & Tribute
Type: Article
J. Mark Ramseyer, Mixing-and-Matching Across (Legal) Family Lines, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 1701.
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Comparative Law
,
Legal History
,
Legal & Political Theory
Type: Article
Abstract
“Legal origins” scholars explain economic performance by a country’s membership in a given “legal family.” To demonstrate the proposition, they regress various indices of performance on, inter alia, that membership. These regressions are properly specified only if (a) countries cannot switch families, and (b) family membership seriously constrains legal change. If countries can switch, then family membership is endogenous to economic performance—since a country will decide whether to stay in a family with an eye to its expected economic effect. If countries can readily borrow across legal family lines, then membership does not bind—and necessarily can have no effect on performance. Unfortunately, neither of these propositions is true. Countries can indeed switch and borrow—easily. That one does not observe much cross-family switching or borrowing in practice merely reflects the fact— nicely demonstrated by Spamann—that countries find it easier to borrow from other countries that use the same language, and that legal families tend to correlate with linguistic families. Given that statutory options within any one legal family usually offer countries all the options they need, countries have little reason to move outside those linguistic groups. I illustrate the possibility of cross-family switching and borrowing with the example of pre-war Japan.
Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, Public and Private Firm Compensation Compared: Evidence from Japanese Tax Returns, 25 Korean Econ. Rev. 5 (2009).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Labor & Employment
,
Taxation
Sub-Categories:
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Executive Compensation
,
Taxation - Personal Income
Type: Article
Abstract
Most studies of executive compensation focus on publicly traded companies. The high levels of compensation there are often attributed to agency slack due to ownership by diffused shareholders. If so, pay at private companies more closely held should be much lower. Governments in the United States and elsewhere do not require the pay of executives in private companies to be publicly disclosed, but until 2004 the tax office of Japan published the name and tax liability of any individual paying over about $100,000 in tax. We match this tax data with rosters of some 1,400 presidents of public and 4,100 presidents of private corporations. We find that public and private company presidents have similar incomes. Both groups earn incomes that rise with the size and profitability of the firm, but the presidents' incomes are more sensitive to profitability at public firms than at private ones. In Japan, at least, public firms pay their presidents no more than private firms do, and tie that compensation more closely to observable performance benchmarks.
Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Good Occupation? Law in the Allied Occupation of Japan, 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 363 (2009).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Legal History
Type: Article
Abstract
They left Japan in shambles. By the time they surrendered in 1945, Japan’s military leaders had slashed industrial production to 1930 levels. Not so with the American occupiers. By the time they left in 1952, they had rebuilt the economy and grown it by fifty percent. By 1960 the economy had tripled, and by 1970 tripled once more. For Japan’s spectacular economic recovery, the American-run Allied Occupation had apparently set the stage. The Americans had occupied, and the economy had boomed. The Americans had ruled, and Japan had thrived. At least during the Occupation’s early years, the Americans had apparently planned and run a “Good Occupation.” Or so it is often said. In fact, the Americans did nothing of the sort. When they arrived in 1945, they brought few economic plans. Rather than invent a new plan, they simply helped incumbent bureaucrats keep the legal controls they had manipulated—disastrously—throughout the War. Coming from the New Deal, many Americans brought an instinctive aversion to competitive market policies. After rehabilitating the Marxist leaders and intellectuals, the Americans let them use the legal apparatus to ideological ends. With a Socialist Premier, Japanese voters let them try. By 1948, the voters had had enough. Under the legal controls, miners did not mine. Firms did not produce. Farmers sold, if they sold at all, only on the black market. With inflation out of control and production stuck at desultory levels, conservatives struck back. They installed the quintessentially capitalist Shigeru Yoshida as Prime Minister; Yoshida promptly shut down the planning apparatus, and Japanese voters ratified the change. Inflation stopped, the economy rebounded, and Washington politicians forced their control-inclined agents in Tokyo to acquiesce. After June 1950 (after it had already started to recover), the economy enjoyed a procurement bonus from the Korean War.
J. Mark Ramseyer, The Story of Ringling Bros. v. Ringling: Nepotism and Cycling at the Circus, in Corporate Law Stories 135 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
Sub-Categories:
Business Organizations
,
Corporate Governance
Type: Book
Abstract
The Ringling case presents itself as an irrational spat over board seats among spoiled investors. It is not. The investors were not fighting over board seats; they were fighting instead over corporate offices. Neither were they irrational. Although Edith Ringling pushed her incompetent son and Aubrey Haley her inappropriate husband, they did so to their private advantage. Although the circus cycled from one management team to another, the investors always promoted the new teams for private gain. The root of the Ringling dispute lay not in irrationality but in the inability of the law to enforce duty-of-loyalty standards. The duty does not just mandate fairness. If enforced, it promotes corporate performance (and the aggregate welfare of all investors) by removing the incentive to appoint less able kin, and the tendency of management teams to cycle. The Ringling circus did not degenerate into the chaos in which it found itself because the investors were spoiled or irrational. It degenerated because the law could not enforce the duty of loyalty. Translated and published in Chinese (2012).
Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Implications of Trade Credit for Bank Monitoring: Suggestive Evidence from Japan, 17 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 317 (2008).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Firms in modern developed economies borrow from both banks and trade partners. Using Japanese manufacturing data from the 1960s, we estimate the price of trade credit, and explore some of the ways firms choose between the credit and bank loans. We find that firms of all sizes borrow heavily from their trade partners, and at implicit rates that track the explicit rates banks would charge. They borrow from banks when they anticipate needing money for relatively long periods; they turn to trade partners when they face short-term unexpected exigencies. This apparent contrast in the term structures follows, we suggest, from the fundamentally different way bankers and trade partners cut default risk. Because bankers seldom know their borrowers' industries first hand, they rely on formal legal protection (like security interests). Because trade partners know the industry well, they reduce risk by monitoring their borrowers closely instead. Because the costs to creating legal mechanisms are heavily front-loaded, bankers focus on long-term debt; because the costs of monitoring debtors are ongoing, trade creditors do not. Apparently, banks monitor less than we have thought.
Minoru Nakazato & J. Mark Ramseyer, Bidding for Ballplayers: A Research Note, 26 J. Japanese L. 85 (2008).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Gaming & Sports Law
,
Empirical Legal Studies
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Is Japanese baseball a different game? In this short research note we offer a new approach to the question Whiting posed so famously and polemically three decades ago – we ask whether owners in the two countries bid for players offering different skills. If baseball in Japan “isn’t baseball,” then perhaps owners compete for a different type of player? In the note that follows, we combine data on player performance and salaries to ask whether they do. Obviously, this is a limited inquiry. We do not address many of the myriad other ways in which baseball might indeed differ in the two countries. Nonetheless, we do offer the project as a way to test indirectly an important component of Whiting’s more general proposition – whether fans in the two countries demand different athletic contests. We follow the discussion with three peripheral but distinct inquiries: (a) which kinds of players earn the highest endorsement incomes?; (b) do teams pay Japanese and American players and black American and white American players equally?; and (c) what effect do the mandatory nine-year contracts in Japan have on player pay?
J. Mary Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Political Uncertainty's Effect on Judicial Recruitment and Retention: Japan in the 1990s, 35 J. Comp. Econ. 329 (2007).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Government & Politics
Sub-Categories:
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Because of the risk of political interference, in countries with managed courts, jurists who share ruling-party preferences disproportionately self-select into judicial instead of private careers. During political turmoil, such jurists will find judicial careers less attractive. Orthodox potential jurists will disproportionately shun the courts, and orthodox incumbent judges will disproportionately resign. Unorthodox potential jurists, on the other hand, might find the judiciary more attractive. Combining data on a random sample of 1605 Japanese lawyers and on all 2502 judges hired between 1971 and 2001, we locate evidence consistent with these hypotheses: after the political crisis of 1993, the recruitment of young lawyers from elite universities lagged, while the number of early resignations increased.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Not-So-Ordinary Judges in Ordinary Courts: Teaching Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1199 (2007).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Government & Politics
,
Banking & Finance
,
Labor & Employment
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Fiduciaries
,
Shareholders
,
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
Employee Benefits
Type: Article
Abstract
By juxtaposing at-will employment with corporate fiduciary duties, Jordan v. Duff & Phelps creates something of a classroom brain-twister. Yet the exchange between Frank Easterbrook (writing for the majority) and Richard Posner (dissenting) also illustrates two fundamental but seldom recognized principles of real-world courts. First, the bench is properly a place for honest jurists of moderate talent (ideally, monitored for their work). It is not a place for men and women with the independence and sophistication of Posner and Easterbrook. Such judges can muddy the law by trying to fix bad precedent, and worsen the law by setting interventionist examples for their far less talented peers. Second, by basic second-best principles, the right legal rule for a substantial fraction of contractual disputes is not a rule designed to facilitate efficient deals. It is a rule that dismisses a plaintiff’s claim forthright. We live in a world with imperfect judges, costly and dishonest attorneys, and only moderately intelligent juries. As Posner implicitly recognizes in Jordan (but other judges rarely do), many cases are simply beyond the capacity of such real-world courts to handle cost-effectively.
Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Beguiling Appeal of Banks, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1005 (2007).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Banking
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Corporate law scholars sometimes present creditor-monitoring as a solution to the problems posed by dispersed ownership. They then cite the Japanese “main bank system” as an example of a successful, economy-wide creditor-monitoring regime. In fact, the Japanese main bank system does not exist, and never did. More basically, however, such scholars miss the way that dispersed ownership need not necessarily pose a “problem”: sometimes it does, but the firms with such ownership for which it is a problem will tend to abandon it or disappear. If firms in competitive economies maintain dispersed ownership structures, usually they maintain them because the structure fits the exigencies the firm presents. Neither does creditor monitoring necessarily present a “solution”: sometimes it does, and the firms with such a system for which it does work as a solution will tend to keep it and persist. If firms lack creditor monitoring, usually they lack it because it would not fit.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, The Case for Managed Judges: Learning from Japan after the Political Upheaval of 1993, 154 U.. Pa. L. Rev. 1879 (2006).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Government & Politics
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
Sub-Categories:
Empirical Legal Studies
,
Judges & Jurisprudence
,
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Article
Abstract
Although the executive branch appoints Japanese Supreme Court justices as it does in the United States, a personnel office under the control of the Supreme Court rotates lower court Japanese judges through a variety of posts. This creates the possibility that politicians might indirectly use the postings to reward or punish judges. For forty years, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) controlled the legislature and appointed the Supreme Court justices who in turn controlled the careers of these lower-court judges. In 1993, it temporarily lost control. We use regression analysis to examine whether the end of the LDP’s electoral lock changed the court’s promotion system, and find surprisingly little change. Whether before or after 1993, the Supreme Court used the personnel office to "manage" the careers of lower court judges. The result: uniform and predictable judgments that economize on litigation costs by facilitating out-of-court settlements. Reprinted as a chapter in The Contemporary Civil Law Tradition, edited by John Henry Merryman, David S. Clark & John Owen Haley (2015).
Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Japanese Industrial Finance at the Close of the 19th Century: Trade Credit and Financial Intermediation, 43 Explorations Econ. Hist. 94 (2006).
Categories:
Banking & Finance
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Banking
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Legal History
Type: Article
Abstract
In a series of recent studies, several economic historians (most prominently Richard Sylla) argue that successful economies experience “financial revolutions” before undergoing rapid growth. In the U.S., they suggest Hamilton masterminded the financial revolution by putting the public finance in order and facilitating private banks. Might Matsukata, they continue, have done the same in Japan? Japan did indeed experience a financial revolution in the late 19th century. Matsukata, however, did not mastermind the revolution in advance of private-sector demand. Instead, private investors created much of the financial infrastructure in response to demand from industrial firms. What is more, most firms (at least in the pivotal silk industry) raised the funds they needed through trade credit rather than securities markets or banks.
Distribution in Japan (Yoshiro Miwa, Kiyohiko G. Nishimura & J. Mark Ramseyer eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
Categories:
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Banking & Finance
Sub-Categories:
Economics
,
Contracts
,
Commercial Law
,
Finance
,
Financial Markets & Institutions
,
Corporate Law
,
Business Organizations
,
Corporate Governance
,
Law & Economics
Type: Book
Abstract
Several years have passed since the 'store wars' over barriers to foreign products at Japanese distribution firms. Yet among English-speaking readers, how these firms operate remains a puzzle. In this book, the best Japanese scholars in their fields attempt to unravel that puzzle. Avoiding culture-based explanations, they employ a systematic and rigorous economic logic---yet, since they also avoid mathematical notation, the argument remains accessible to generalist readers. Collectively, the authors make four basic points: * Within a country, distribution is less similar than it appears. Not only does it vary enormously across industries, but it often varies within a given industry as well. * Across countries, distribution is less diverse than it appears. Although appearances sometimes suggest major cross-national contrasts, on more careful analysis the differences often disappear. * Distribution sometimes depends on the product involved. Because distribution functions as the principal means by which manufacturers acquire information about consumer preferences, the character of distribution can depend crucially both on demand patterns and on manufacturing technology. * In the absence of regulatory intervention, distribution generally will be efficient and non-exclusionary. Regulation usually introduces inefficiency and often creates barriers to entry. Importantly, however, the targets of exclusion will less often involve foreign than domestic competitors. To illustrate these points, the authors draw on both analyses that cross various sectors and analyses that are specific to sectors; they study both regulated and unregulated industries; they describe industries with extensive imports, industries with extensive exports, and industries with neither; they examine the effect of technological change; and they introduce a variety of case studies, from agriculture and automobiles to electrical appliances and apparel.
Japanese Law in Context: Readings in Society, the Economy, and Politics (Curtis J. Milhaupt, J. Mark Ramseyer & Michael K. Young eds., Harvard Univ. Asia Ctr. 2001).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Book
Abstract
This is a wide-ranging selection of 130 readings in Japanese law. The essays, extracted from previously published books and articles, cover subjects including historical context, the civil law tradition, the legal services industry, dispute resolution, constitutional law, contracts, torts, criminal law, family law, employment law, corporate law, and economic regulation. This unique collection of readings is accompanied by the texts of the Japanese constitution and other basic laws.
Japanese Law: Readings in the Political Economy of Japanese Law (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., Ashgate Publ'g 2001).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
East Asian Legal Studies
Type: Book
Abstract
This volume presents a selection of readings in the political economy of Japanese law.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Japanese Law: An Economic Approach (Univ. of Chi. Press 1999).
Categories:
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Banking & Finance
,
Property Law
,
Consumer Finance
,
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Criminal Law & Procedure
,
Government & Politics
,
Taxation
,
Discrimination & Civil Rights
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Consumer Contracts
,
Sentencing & Punishment
,
Corporate Law
,
Corporate Governance
,
Securities Law & Regulation
,
Litigation & Settlement
,
Practice & Procedure
,
Torts
,
Housing Law
,
Law & Economics
,
Administrative Law & Agencies
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Property Rights
,
Tax Policy
,
Taxation - Personal Income
,
Taxation - Corporate
Type: Book
Abstract
In this introduction to Japanese law, J. Mark Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato combine an economic approach with a clear and often amusing account of the law itself to challenge commonly held ideas about the law. Arguing against such things as the assumption that Japanese law differs from law in the United States and the idea that law plays only a trivial role in Japan or is culturally determined, this book will be recognized as a major contribution to the understanding of Japanese law. Awarded the Professional/Scholarly Publishing Award by the Association of American Publishers for the best book in law (1999). Excerpts reprinted in: Comparative Corporate Law: United States, European Union, China and Japan, Cases and Materials (Larry Catá Backer ed., 2002) and Civil Litigation in Comparative Context (Oscar G. Chase, et al. eds., 2007). Paperback edition (2000).
J. Mark. Ramseyer, Odd Markets in Japanese History: Law and Economic Growth (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Disciplinary Perspectives & Law
,
Property Law
,
Legal Profession
,
Environmental Law
,
Civil Practice & Procedure
,
Banking & Finance
,
Consumer Finance
,
Family Law
,
Corporate Law & Securities
,
Labor & Employment
Sub-Categories:
Contracts
,
Consumer Contracts
,
Business Organizations
,
Corporate Governance
,
Torts
,
Law & Economics
,
Water Law
,
Children's Law & Welfare
,
Domestic Relations
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Employment Practice
,
Legal History
,
Property Rights
Type: Book
Abstract
Employing a rational-choice approach, Professor Ramseyer studies the impact of Japanese law on economic growth in Japan. Toward that end, the author investigates the way law governed various markets, and the way that people negotiated contracts within those markets. Findings reveal that the legal system generally promoted mutually advantageous deals, and that people generally negotiated in ways that shrewdly promoted their private best interests. Whether in the markets for indentured servants, prostitutes, or marriage partners, this study reports little evidence of either age- or gender-related exploitation. Paperback edition, 2008.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Frances McCall Rosenbluth, The Politics of Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan (Cambridge Univ. Press 1995).
Categories:
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
,
Legal Profession
Sub-Categories:
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Comparative Law
,
Legal History
Type: Book
Abstract
This book examines a key question of modern Japanese politics: why the Meiji oligarchs were unable to design institutions capable of protecting their power. The authors question why the oligarchs chose the political institutions they did, and what the consequences of those choices were for Japan's political competition, economic development, and diplomatic relations. Indeed, they argue, it was the oligarchs' very inability to agree among themselves on how to rule that prompted them to cut the military loose from civilian control--a decision that was to have disastrous consequences not only for Japan but for the rest of the world. Paperback edition, with corrections, 1998. Awarded Luebbert Award, for best book in Comparative Politics, American Political Science Association. Translated and republished as: Nihon seiji to goriteki sentaku [Japanese Politics and Rational Choice] (Tokyo: Keiso shobo, 2006).
J. Mark Ramseyer & Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace (Harvard Univ. Press 1993).
Categories:
Government & Politics
,
International, Foreign & Comparative Law
Sub-Categories:
Politics & Political Theory
,
East Asian Legal Studies
,
Comparative Law
,
Foreign Law
Type: Book
Abstract
Mark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth show how rational-choice theory can be applied to Japanese politics. Using the concept of principal and agent, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth construct a persuasive account of political relationships in Japan. In doing so, they demonstrate that political considerations and institutional arrangements reign in what, to most of the world, looks like an independently powerful bureaucratic state. Paperback edition, with a new Preface, 1997. Excerpts reprinted in: Comparative Law: Law and the Legal Process in Japan (Kenneth L. Port & Gerald Paul McAlinn, eds., 2d ed. 2003) and The Japanese Legal System: Text and Materials (Meryll Dean ed., 1997). Translated and republished as: Nihon seiji no keizaigaku: seiken seito no goriteki sentaku [The Economics of Japanese Politics: A Rational-Choice Approach to Political Administration and Political Parties] (Tokyo: Kobundo Press, 1995).